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ABSTRACT

Cities across the country are experiencing rapid increases in
gentrification: the influx of middle-class, usually white, residents into cities
with large minority populations. Reversing a decades-long trend of white
flight out of urban city schools, a significant number of white middle-class
gentrifiers are now enrolling their children in urban city public schools.
Local officials in many gentrifying cities value the renewed interest of middleclass white residents in urban public schools because it represents an
opportunity to finally racially integrate urban public schools. It also represents
an opportunity to keep middle-class gentrifiers, and their tax dollars, from
fleeing to the suburbs and suburban school districts once they have school-aged
children.
In order to attract white middle-class gentrifiers, this Article suggests
that local officials in some gentrifying cities are implementing certain public
school reforms for the specific purpose of making their school systems more
palatable to gentrifiers. Such reforms, the Article argues, harm poor and
minority students by disproportionally displacing them from their
neighborhood public schools while simultaneously limiting the number of
quality public and charter schools available to them. While advocates for poor
and minority students are mounting legal challenges to the reforms, to date the
legal challenges have not been successful because courts lack the doctrinal
support to find that the reforms constitute an actionable form of intentional
discrimination.
This Article applies Derek Bell’s Interest Convergence Theory and
argues for the implementation of legislative solutions that can benefit both poor
minority students and gentrifiers. Such an approach is a more effective way to
both capitalize on the renewed interest of white middle-class residents in urban
public schools and to improve educational opportunities for poor and minority
students.
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INTRODUCTION

For much of the late 20th century, the dominant narrative surrounding
American urban public schools revolved around middle-class white flight and
abandonment of public schools. Precipitated in part by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education1 and
buttressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley,2 middleclass white students fled urban schools for suburban schools or enrolled in
private schools in large numbers.3 As a result, most urban schools were left
with a predominately poor and minority student population.4 Recently however,
in some urban school districts, the trend of white middle-class flight is slowly
subsiding. A small but increasing number of white middle-class families are
enrolling their children in urban public schools.5 This increase is part of a much
broader trend involving a resurgence of gentrification.6 Indeed, cities across the
country are gentrifying at a rapid rate as young, middle-class, and usually white
professionals take up residence in neighborhoods that were occupied by
predominately poor and minority residents for decades.7

1

402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing for the busing of students across neighborhoods in order to
desegregate schools).
2
418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting inter-district desegregation orders, which in light of
urban/suburban residential segregation, essentially insulated suburban white schools from having
to integrate).
3
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1608 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Milliken encouraged white flight by allowing those who wished to avoid
racially integrated schools to move to the suburbs without fear that desegregation would reach
suburban schools); Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say
About the Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans?, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 80–94 (1983)
(summarizing various white-flight studies and concluding that school desegregation orders
accelerated white flight).
4
See generally Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then, Segregation
Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POL’Y INST. 17–18 (2013), http://s2.epi.org/
files/2013/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Linn Posey, Middle- and Upper-Middle-Class Parent Action for Urban Public
Schools: Promise or Paradox, 114 TCHRS. C. REC. 1, 1–34 (2012) (finding that a growing
number of young professionals in central city areas want to maintain an urban lifestyle while
raising a family and that growing economic pressures are compelling a large number of parents
to opt for public rather than private school); Bill Turque, Henderson Calls White Enrollment
Growth Good for D.C. Schools, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/henderson-calls-white-enrollment-growth-good-for-dc-schools/2011/09/02/gIQA
kBknxJ_story.html (noting that “white enrollment in the 45,000-student system was approaching
10 percent—about double the share of a decade ago”).
6
For a more in-depth discussion of the meaning of gentrification generally and how it is
used in this Article, see infra Part II.
7
See Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing
Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 711, 711–63 (1999)

680

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

While much scholarly attention is being paid to the ways in which the
resurgence of gentrification is impacting urban housing markets,8 little attention
is being paid to the effects of gentrification on urban public schools.9 This is
likely the case because in past waves of urban gentrification, white middleclass residents either avoided the public schools or moved out of the city once
they had school-aged children.10 In the most recent resurgence of urban
gentrification, however, insulation of public schools from the effects of
gentrification is no longer the norm.11 Instead, schools which were once
considered too Black,12 too poor, and too academically deficient to warrant
(finding that widespread evidence points to a revival of central land markets in urban cities such
as Chicago, Boston, and New York); Natalie Hopkinson, Opinion, Farewell to Chocolate City,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/farewell-tochocolate-city.html.
8
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699,
814–815 (1993) (“While gentrification may indeed increase property values and bring higher
maintenance and investment levels in a neighborhood, gentrification necessarily involves
displacement of low-income tenants.”); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification:
Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 739, 768–70 (1993) (describing the effects of certain types of zoning measures as resulting
in the displacement of low-income residents through the process of gentrification).
9
A few scholars have analyzed the effects of gentrification on public schools. See, e.g.,
MAIA BLOOMFIELD CUCCHIARA, MARKETING SCHOOLS, MARKETING CITIES: WHO WINS AND WHO
LOSES WHEN SCHOOLS BECOME URBAN AMENITIES (2013) (describing efforts in Philadelphia’s
gentrifying Center City to market public schools to gentrifiers); JENNIFER BURNS STILLMAN,
GENTRIFICATION AND SCHOOLS: THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION WHEN WHITES REVERSE FLIGHT
(2012) (describing efforts by middle-class gentrifiers to reform local public schools); Chase M.
Billingham & Shelley McDonough Kimelberg, Middle-Class Parents, Urban Schooling, and the
Shift from Consumption to Production of Urban Space, 28 SOC. F. 85 (2013) (analyzing shifts in
gentrifiers’ public school consumption patterns in Boston).
10
See Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, Dealing with Neighborhood Change: A Primer on
Gentrification and Policy Choices, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CTR. ON URB. & METROPOLITAN
POL’Y 1, 37–38 (2001), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2001/04/metropolitanpolicy
(examining in a series of essays the displacement of low-income, usually minority, residents
caused by gentrification but noting that “poor schools in neighborhoods ripe for gentrification
rarely pose an obstacle [to gentrification] since many of those who move to [gentrifying]
neighborhoods . . . do not have children”).
11
See, e.g., CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 187 (noting increases in the number of white
children of gentrifiers enrolled in neighborhood public schools in the gentrified Center City
section of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and anticipating a greater increase due to the changing
racial demographics in Center City neighborhoods); STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 2 (describing the
internal conflict that an increasing number of gentrifiers feel in New York City as they grapple
with finding a way to stay in the city and provide their children with a quality education).
12
When using the term “Black,” I use the upper-case “B” to reflect the view, articulated by
other scholars, that Black people are a specific cultural group; therefore, the term “Black” is
worthy of being capitalized as a proper noun. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my
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serious consideration by middle-class whites are now being given a second
look by middle-class white gentrifiers who wish to remain in the city rather
than flee to the suburbs or pay costly tuition for private school.13
Importantly, government economic development and housing policies
are playing a critical role in facilitating the resurgence of gentrification.14 This
Article suggests that government policies aimed at facilitating gentrification are
now extending into the education policy arena as well. To be sure, many local
governments see the increasing willingness of gentrifiers to enroll their children
in urban schools as a critical opportunity to retain white middle-class
residents.15 These local governments view white middle-class residents as a key
ingredient to uplifting the economic and social trajectory of urban cities that
often struggle with an anemic tax base and a plethora of social problems.16
To that end, local officials often view improving urban public schools
as necessary in order to sustain gentrification because gentrifiers expect the
amenities in cities to match their middle- and upper-class status and privilege.17
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group
and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1710 n.3 (1993) (“I use the term ‘Black’ throughout the paper for the
reasons articulated by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw. I share her view that ‘Blacks, like Asians,
Latinos, and other “minorities,” constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require
denotation as a proper noun.’”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982)
(suggesting that the letter “B” in Black should be capitalized because Black is not “merely a
color of skin pigmentation, but . . . a heritage, an experience, a culture and personal identity”).
13

See Katherine B. Hankins, The Final Frontier: Charter Schools as New Community
Institutions of Gentrification, 28 URB. GEOGRAPHY 113, 126 (2007) (“Parent-gentrifiers are
driving a new demand for urban services that gentrifiers of old largely did not need or
bypassed.”); Billingham & Kimelberg, supra note 9, at 101 (studying gentrifier parents in Boston
and finding that many decided to utilize their “financial, social, and human capital” to find
schools in Boston rather than move to the suburbs or enroll their children in private school).
14
See infra Part II.B.1–2.
15
See, e.g., Linn Posey-Maddox, Shelley McDonough Kimelberg & Maia Cucchiara,
Middle-Class Parents and Urban Public Schools: Current Research and Future Directions, 8
SOC. COMPASS 466, 466–67 (2014) (“[A]ttracting [middle-class] families to local public schools
has emerged as a strategy for nurturing the revitalization of some cities.”).
16
See, e.g., Jonetta Rose Barras, Recruiting Diversity: Michelle Rhee’s Campaign to
Diversify DCPS Means Wooing White Parents, WASH. CITY PAPER (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/39647/michelle-rhees-campaign-to-diversify-dc-pu
blic-schools-means-wooing/full (“What used to be white flight is turning into ‘bright flight’ to
the cities that have become magnets for aspiring young adults who see access to knowledgebased jobs, public transportation and a new city ambiance as an attraction.”); Kevin Hartnett,
Middle-Class Parents in the Boston Public Schools, BOS. GLOBE (June 4, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2013/06/middle_class_pa.html (“For city
officials, middle-class parents are a seduction and also a policy riddle. They are a boon to the
schools their kids attend and a great source of tax revenue for the city in general.”).
17
See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 23 (2006) (documenting
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Many urban school systems in gentrifying areas do not match the middle- and
upper-class privilege and status of gentrifiers because they serve predominately
poor and minority students.18 They also have a reputation for being low quality.
In a quest to make their schools attractive for gentrifiers, this Article argues that
local officials in some gentrifying cities are enacting or expanding pre-existing
public school reforms in an attempt to increase both the reputational value of
their school systems and the number of middle-class and non-minority students
willing to enroll in urban public schools.19 The Article further suggests that
they are most prominently relying upon two public school reforms: (i)
replacing so-called failing or underutilized traditional public schools with
charter schools and (ii) enacting school enrollment policies that favor
neighborhood schools rather than a system of open enrollment.20
The net effect of these two reforms has been to further increase racial
segregation in schools. To be sure, research suggests that closing public schools
diminishes the number of traditional public schools available to poor and
minority students.21 Poor and minority students are then required to compete
for entry into a limited number of quality charter schools.22 Further, the better
public schools in many urban areas are often located in heavily gentrified
neighborhoods.23 As a result, by changing enrollment policies to favor
the ways in which urban cities offer various upscale amenities and services which allow
gentrifiers to “display [their] status through [their] environment”).
18
See, e.g., Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the
Social Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 117, 201 (2002) (finding that
middle-class parents relied upon information passed through social networks and the number of
middle-class and white students enrolled in a school in determining whether a school was high
quality or not).
19
See, e.g., CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 2 (“Urban areas have experimented with voluntary
choice programs, magnet schools, charter schools . . . all designed, at least in part, to slow
suburban flight and increase race and class integration in schools.”).
20
See Tomeka Davis & Deirdre Oakley, Linking Charter School Emergence to Urban
Revitalization and Gentrification: A Socio-Spatial Analysis of Three Cities, 35 J. URB. AFF. 81,
99 (2013) (finding “clear trends in Chicago and Philadelphia, demonstrating an association
between urban revitalization and charter school emergence”); Pauline Lipman & Nathan Haines,
From Accountability to Privatization and African American Exclusion: Chicago’s “Renaissance
2010,” 21 EDUC. POL’Y 471, 488 (2007) (detailing a plan to close failing schools in Chicago and
noting that “[c]losing schools and then reopening them as new schools is a key aspect of
signifying to middle-class gentrifiers that the area will be literally reborn”).
21
See infra Part III.D.
22
See infra Part III.D.
23
See, e.g., CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 10–11 (describing the ways in which neighborhood
schools in gentrified areas in Philadelphia benefit from the resources and active involvement of
middle-class parents to create high quality neighborhood schools); JACQUELINE EDELBERG &
SUSAN KURLAND, HOW TO WALK TO SCHOOL: A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEIGHBORHOOD RENAISSANCE
(2009) (discussing how parents in a middle-class gentrified neighborhood in Chicago utilized
their financial and cultural capital to transform a traditional neighborhood school into one of the
best schools in Chicago).
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neighborhood enrollment rather than open enrollment, schools are created for
gentrifiers that serve almost exclusively their children and no others.
Advocates for poor and minority students wishing to challenge the
aforementioned exclusionary effects of public school reforms in gentrifying
areas have, to date, relied upon court actions in which they allege that the
reforms constitute unlawful discrimination.24 Some groups are also bringing
administrative complaints with the United States Department of Education,
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) alleging violations of Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act (“Title VI”).25
The primary argument made by this Article is that neither the courts
nor OCR have the necessary doctrinal support in the case law related to
intentional discrimination to properly address the harms caused to poor and
minority students by the reforms. Thus, instead of using the court system to
prevent the harms to poor and minority students as a result of the market-based
reforms, this Article takes the position that legislative solutions that benefit
both poor and minority students and gentrifiers should be explored. A
legislative approach, rather than a litigation approach, is a more effective way
of capitalizing on the renewed interest of white middle-class gentrifiers in
enrolling their children in urban public schools.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly describes the resurgence
of gentrification in urban areas. It examines the various waves of gentrification
in the United States and assesses the ways in which government economic
development and housing policies contribute to the resurgence of gentrification
in the United States. It then discusses the benefits and costs of gentrification.
Part III examines the impact of the resurgence of gentrification on urban public
schools. It specifically focuses on three cities: Chicago; Philadelphia; and
Washington, D.C. It analyzes the ways in which public school reforms are
being used in these cities as a means of enticing predominantly white middleand upper-class gentrifiers to remain in the city. It also analyzes how such a
strategy harms poor and minority students.

24
See Smith v. Henderson, No. 13-420 (JEB), 2014 WL 3555310 (D.D.C. July 18, 2014)
(challenging the closure of neighborhood schools in predominately Black areas as racially
discriminatory); Swan v. Bd. of Educ., No. 13-C-3623, 2013 WL 4401439 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15,
2013) (challenging the closure of several Chicago public schools in predominately Black and
Latino neighborhoods as racially discriminatory); V.L. v. Sch. Dist. of Phil., No. 2:12-cv-03182
(E.D. Pa. filed June 5, 2012) (challenging the closure of North Philadelphia neighborhood
schools as having a disparate impact on poor and disabled students).
25
See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Are School Closings the “New Jim Crow?” Activists File Civil
Rights Complaints, WASH. POST (May 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/educat
ion/2014/05/13/1a0d3ae8-dab9-11e3-b745-87d39690c5c0_story.html (“Arguing that school
closures in cities across the country disproportionately affect African American students,
community activists filed three federal civil rights complaints . . . challenging closures in
Newark, New Orleans and Chicago . . . .”).
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Part IV discusses the various legal challenges that advocates for poor
and minority students are making to public school closings and the expansion
of charter schools in gentrifying areas. It then analyzes the refusal of courts to
conceptualize the harms suffered by poor minority students because of the
public school reforms as an actionable discrimination.
Part V examines the ways in which the public school reforms currently
being enacted in gentrifying areas create an interest divergence between poor
minority students and gentrifiers. It applies Derek Bell’s Interest Convergence
Theory, identifies ways in which the interests of poor and minority families
converge with white middle-class gentrifiers, and argues that application of this
theory to legislative reforms of gentrification may allow for a political solution
that satisfies both parties’ interests. It then proposes legislative solutions that
could meet the needs of both poor and minority students and gentrifiers. Part VI
concludes.
II. THE RESURGENCE OF GENTRIFICATION
Various meanings and political connotations are ascribed to the term
gentrification.26 Some scholars use the term to describe the process by which
housing stock and infrastructure in an urban neighborhood are upgraded and
low-income residents are displaced by middle- and upper-class residents.27
Indeed, the term gentrification was first used by English writer Ruth Glass to
describe the process of middle-class residents moving into working class
neighborhoods in London, upgrading the housing stock, and eventually
displacing the working-class residents.28 Other scholars use the term
gentrification to encapsulate a much broader process of intentional
disinvestment in an urban neighborhood followed by a period of reinvestment
which causes both a class- and race-based transformation of the
neighborhood.29 Lastly, some scholars eschew the notion that gentrification is

26

For a comprehensive discussion of the historical definitions given to gentrification, see J.
JOHN PALEN & BRUCE LONDON, GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD
REVITALIZATION 6–10 (1984).
27
See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 5 (defining gentrification as the
involuntary displacement of residents by higher income residents and the physical upgrading of
the neighborhood and change in the neighborhood’s character).
28
See Ruth Glass, Aspects of Change, in THE GENTRIFICATION DEBATES 18, 18–27 (Japonica
Brown-Saracino ed., 2010).
29
See, e.g., NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST
CITY 37 (1996) (“Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing
market but has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavor: the class remake
of the central urban landscape.”); Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and
Displacement: Connections, Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 198–99 (1985) (defining gentrification as “new residents—who are
disproportionately white, professional, technical, and managerial workers with higher education
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synonymous with displacement and instead use the term to mean an overall
revitalization or improvement of commercial and residential areas in urban
neighborhoods.30
While the definitions and political connotations attached to the term
gentrification vary, three common components emerge: (i) an influx of capital;
(ii) displacement—or at a minimum a change in the class of people who occupy
a neighborhood; and (iii) transformation of the community within the
neighborhood. Given the common modules that emerge from the different
definitions of gentrification used by scholars, this Article uses the term
gentrification to mean an influx of capital into a community that once suffered
from a disinvestment of capital, which results in the movement of people,
particularly higher-income people, into a community. Applying this definition
of gentrification, urban cities across America are experiencing staggering
increases in gentrification.31 Scholars are labeling this uptick in gentrification
as a resurgence of gentrification.32
This current resurgence of gentrification is being further fueled by the
enactment of local public school reforms. To better understand the ways in
which these reforms are being used, it is important to understand the contours
of modern day gentrification, particularly the ways in which it is different from
past rounds of gentrification. To that end, this section provides a brief
description of the various waves of gentrification in the United States. It then
examines the most recent resurgence of gentrification, paying particular
attention to the role that government economic development and housing
policies are playing in facilitating the resurgence of gentrification. It concludes
by discussing the benefits and downsides to the most recent resurgence of
gentrification.

and income levels—replac[ing] older residents—who are disproportionately low-income,
working-class and poor, minority and ethnic group members, and elderly from older and
previously dilapidated inner-city housing in a spatially concentrated manner that is to a degree
differing substantially from the general level of change in the community or region as a whole”);
john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and
the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433 (2003) (describing the
ways in which gentrification is rooted in race and class transformation of urban areas).
30
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 406 (2003)
(noting that the negative connotations attached to gentrification are misguided, particularly the
idea that gentrification displaces poor minorities, and instead defining gentrification as “the
process by which people of higher incomes move into lower income urban areas and seek to
change its physical and social fabric to better meet their needs and preferences”).
31
See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 7, at 713 (arguing that “[g]entrification . . . witnessed a
resurgence in the 1990s that . . . quickly erased any lingering suspicion that the process was only
a brief historical aberration”).
32
See id. at 713–15.
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A. Waves of Gentrification
The causes and consequences of gentrification are subject to much
debate.33 A complete account of the various theories regarding gentrification is
beyond the scope of this Article and has been written about extensively by
other authors.34 Nevertheless, the scholarly literature on gentrification generally
recognizes three different time periods or waves in which gentrification
occurred in American urban cities.35 Some scholars also suggest that the
gentrification that is currently occurring is part of an evolving fourth wave of
gentrification.36
The first wave of gentrification occurred from the 1950s through the
mid-1970s.37 It involved the infusion of public subsidies, particularly tax
incentives, into urban areas in order to induce investment and relocation into
inner-cities by businesses and affluent individuals.38 This was done in an
attempt to counter the mass outmigration of white residents from urban innercities to the suburbs during the same time frame.39 Gentrification during this
time period generally occurred in a sporadic rather than deliberate manner.40 In
the United States, gentrification during this time period was also localized
insofar as it was limited to larger urban inner-cities primarily in the
northeastern part of the country.41

33
See, e.g., Japonica Brown-Saracino, Overview: The Gentrification Debates, in THE
GENTRIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 28, at 1, 14.
34
See, e.g., id.; TIM BUTLER, GENTRIFICATION AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES 35–54 (1997);
SMITH, supra note 29, at 38–42.
35
See generally Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Gentrification, Housing Policy and the
New Context of Urban Redevelopment, in 6 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
211, 217–19 (Kevin Fox Gotham ed., 2001) (describing three waves of gentrification with “each
wave ‘tied to a particular constellation of political and economic conditions nested at larger
geographic scales’”); Jason Hackworth & Neil Smith, The Changing State of Gentrification, 92 J.
ECON. & SOC. GEOGRAPHY 464, 465–68 (2001).
36
See LORETTA LEES, TOM SLATER & ELVIN WYLY, GENTRIFICATION 179 (2008) (“Several
developments in the first half of this decade . . . suggest that we are seeing a new, distinctive
fourth wave of gentrification . . . .”).
37
See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 466.
38
See id.
39
See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 217.
40
See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 466 (noting that the first wave of gentrification
during the 1950s though 1970s was sporadic and state-led as local and national governments
sought to counteract the economic decline of inner-city neighborhoods); Christopher Niedt,
Gentrification and the Grassroots: Popular Support in the Revanchist Suburb, 28 J. URB. AFF. 99,
100 (2006).
41
See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 467.
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The second wave of gentrification occurred in the post-recession 1970s
through the late 1980s.42 Generally speaking, during the second wave, the state
took a laissez-faire approach towards gentrification.43 It only intervened in the
form of public-private partnerships once investment by private actors proved
that gentrification was viable in a particular area.44 Significantly, gentrification
during this time period became integrated into a much larger global and
national scale process.45 Put another way, whereas gentrification during the first
wave occurred on a localized level in certain areas such as the northeast United
States, gentrification during the second wave became a global phenomenon.46
Importantly, during this wave of gentrification, long-time residents and
activists often mounted aggressive challenges to gentrification because
gentrification was commonly linked to the displacement of minorities and the
poor.47
The third wave of gentrification occurred during the post-recession
1990s.48 This third wave—or resurgence of gentrification—is arguably ongoing
today,49 though some scholars suggest that this third stage is morphing into an
even more complex fourth wave of gentrification.50 For purposes of this
Article, the third and fourth waves of gentrification are discussed together as
the “resurgence of gentrification.”
The resurgence of gentrification differs from prior waves of
gentrification in significant ways. First, the bounds of gentrification are now
expanding beyond just the inner-city and into more remote locations such as

42

See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 217.
See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 466.
44
See id. (noting that most local state efforts related to gentrification “focused on prodding
the private market rather than directly orchestrating gentrification”).
45
See id. at 468; Niedt, supra note 40, at 100.
46
See SMITH, supra note 29, at 36–37 (suggesting that gentrification by the 1970s became
part of a global urban restructuring as cities found themselves competing in the global market).
47
See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 468.
48
See Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 218.
49
See powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 459–65 (detailing the different stages of
gentrification occurring in Detroit, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago); Wyly & Hammel,
supra note 7, at 761 (concluding that gentrification in Chicago, Boston, Seattle, Washington
D.C., Detroit, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia showed clear evidence of gentrification in the 1990s
and noting that “[b]etween 1992 and 1997 gentrified neighborhoods in those cities attracted
mortgage investment[s] that grew more than 2.3 times as fast as the suburban rate”); Timothy
Williams, Cities Mobilize to Help Those Threatened by Gentrification, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/us/cities-helping-residents-resist-the-new-gentry.htm
l?_r=0 (noting that the latest wave of gentrification happened very quickly and citing Boston,
Seattle, New York, Washington D.C., and Atlanta amongst the fastest gentrifying cities).
50
See, e.g., LEES, SLATER & WYLY, supra note 36, at 173–86 (arguing that a new fourth
wave of gentrification emerged after the 2001 recession which is being fueled by changes to
housing finance policies, resulting in increased capital investment in inner-cities).
43
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inner-ring suburbs.51 Similar to the gentrification expansion that occurred
during the second wave, the boundary expansions of gentrification are also part
and parcel of globalization.52
Second, corporate developers and financial institutions are much more
involved and visible during this recent resurgence of gentrification. Corporate
developers are increasingly spearheading current gentrification efforts, whereas
in past waves of gentrification, corporate developers and financial institutions
only got involved once a neighborhood had already begun the process of
gentrifying.53 Further, some scholars suggest that while financial institutions
were previously risk averse, reluctant to make loans to borrowers in gentrifying
areas, financial institutions during the resurgence of gentrification are much
more aggressive in making loans, particularly to wealthy individuals or
corporations seeking to enter a gentrifying urban area.54
Third, there is less resistance to gentrification from policymakers and
grassroots advocates this time. Gentrification is now theorized as uplifting the
economic and political plight of poor individuals who are purportedly doomed
to live in neglected and disinvested neighborhoods without the entry of more
affluent individuals and corporations.55 Thus, while gentrification was once
thought to be a dirty word synonymous with displacement and marginalization
of the poor and minorities,56 it is now more readily embraced as a solution to
the capital and cultural disinvestment that has long plagued urban areas.57
Lastly, a key factor that differentiates the most recent resurgence of
gentrification from other waves of gentrification is that the resurgence of
gentrification coincides with a cultural shift and economic shift that is drawing
more educated and affluent people to urban cities. With respect to the cultural
shift, living in urban inner-cities was once considered a last resort for
minorities, the poor, and others who lacked viable housing choices.58

51

See Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 468.
See id.
53
Id.; Loretta Lees, Super-Gentrification: The Case of Brooklyn Heights, New York City,
400 URB. STUD. 2487, 2496 (2003) (describing the gentrifying effect of corporate development in
downtown Brooklyn).
54
See LEES, SLATER & WYLY, supra note 36, at 181 (arguing that “[i]n contrast to earlier
waves [of gentrification] when financial institutions were risk averse . . . lenders are now
aggressively competing to make loans”).
55
See Byrne, supra note 30, at 406; Hackworth & Smith, supra note 35, at 468.
56
See Byrne, supra note 30, at 405.
57
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and
Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 551 (2007) (arguing that
“[r]esiding in a gentrifying neighborhood also should ameliorate the social isolation entailed by
economic housing segregation, which some have seen as an important factor in the perpetuation
of poverty”).
58
See McFarlane, supra note 17, at 11.
52
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Particularly for the white middle-class, the ideal vision of success and
achievement was the ability to live in a suburb with a spacious home, minimal
crime, and plenty of space for children and pets to roam.59 Urban cities were
painted as the antithesis of this ideal.60 This is no longer the case. Middle-class
residents, particularly young professionals, are now more likely to be drawn to
urban cities and resist moving to the suburbs.61
Scholars also suggest that the cultural shift that is drawing middle-class
and affluent young professionals to urban cities is intertwined with an
economic shift away from manufacturing and towards service industries.62
They further suggest that “[g]lobalization’s re-ordering of economies away
from manufacturing and towards service industries has dualized the economy
into groups of those with high salaries and those without.”63 The group of
people with high incomes—often called the “creative class”—are typically
knowledge-based professionals such as scientists, engineers, artists, lawyers, or
anyone who makes a living based upon their creative thought process. 64 They
value space that allows them to have face-to-face interactions to meet both their
professional and personal needs.65 Urban cities and not the suburbs are
intentionally positioning themselves to fill the demands of this creative class.
As discussed in the section that follows, local, state, and federal government
policies, economic development, and housing policies are often put in place
specifically to draw the creative class to urban cities, thereby facilitating
gentrification.
B. Recruiting Middle-Class Residents: The Public Policy Dimensions of
the Resurgence of Gentrification
During the mid-20th century, urban cities were decimated by the
decline in the manufacturing economy and the rise of the knowledge-based

59

See id. at 12–13.
See id. at 13.
61
See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Suburbs Try to Prevent an Exodus as Young Adults Move to
Cities and Stay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/nyregion/sub
urbs-try-to-hold-onto-young-adults-as-exodus-to-cities-appears-to-grow.html (summarizing the
results of a study finding that “younger adults are becoming more drawn to denser, more compact
urban environments that offer a number of amenities within walking distance of where they live,”
and suggesting that younger professionals are now inclined to stay in the city rather than move to
a suburb).
62
See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED (2012).
63
McFarlane, supra note 17, at 13.
64
Id. at 13–14.
65
See FLORIDA, supra note 62, at 188–89 (suggesting that place is critical for the creative
class and that they prefer cities because cities are “enabling infrastructure where connections take
place, networks are built, and innovative combinations are consummated”).
60

690

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

economy.66 The decline in the manufacturing economy significantly reduced
the tax base for many urban cities because as manufacturing plants closed
down, cities lacked other viable options for generating tax revenue.67 Urban
cities also saw a substantial number of their middle-class residents depart for
the suburbs.68
Importantly, racially circumscribed government policies encouraged
and aided the mass migration of white middle-class residents from the cities to
the suburbs while keeping minority residents confined to the inner-cities.69 For
example, federal government mortgage insurance underwriting programs would
only underwrite loans for home purchases in racially homogenous white
communities and explicitly encouraged the maintenance of residential
segregation as a matter of public policy.70 Such a policy raised substantial
barriers for Blacks wishing to migrate to the suburbs.71 At the same time,
government policies paved the way for white residents to move to the suburbs.
Federal subsidization of home mortgages for whites only, along with the
federal government providing states with federal funds to build highways,
made it easy for white middle-class citizens to live in suburban outposts and to
commute to central cities for work.72 As a result of these policies, by the mid20th century, middle-class white flight from the cities to the suburbs reached its
peak.73 In turn, many American urban cities found themselves in fiscal distress
due to a limited tax base from which to draw.74 In addition, the residents who
remained in the city were overwhelmingly poor and minority.75
Because of the loss of actual and human capital caused by the decline
of manufacturing and white flight, many urban inner-cities have been on a
quest to attract more middle-class and affluent residents in hopes of shoring up
their tax bases. Indeed, since the 1960s, local government policies in most

66

See supra Part II.A.
See FLORIDA, supra note 62, at 314 (describing the inability of cities such as Detroit,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh to adjust away from the norms of the previous manufacturing economy
and the declines that occurred in those cities as a result); McFarlane, supra note 17, at 9 (“The
loss of middle and upper-income households affected central cities negatively by decreasing the
demand for urban land, reducing land values, and diminishing central cities’ tax bases.”).
68
See generally WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD
WAR II, at 112–13 (2007); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993).
69
See generally sources cited supra note 68.
70
See Erika K. Wilson, Towards a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public
Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1428–29 (2014).
71
Id. at 1428–30 (describing the role of federal, state, and local policies in contributing to
residential racial segregation in the suburbs and urban areas).
72
Id. at 1428.
73
Id. at 1428–30.
74
Id.
75
Id.
67
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urban localities have reflected James Buchanan’s Recruitment Theory.76
Buchanan theorized that in order to not only survive but thrive, urban cities
must enact policies aimed at attracting and retaining more affluent taxpayer
residents.77
More specifically, Buchanan suggested that urban cities must enact
fiscal policies and add amenities to induce “potentially-mobile central-city
taxpayers who contribute to the net fiscal surplus” of a city.78 He also
recommended providing amenities like museums, symphony orchestras, and
theaters that middle-class and affluent residents would find attractive but
unlikely to obtain without great cost in the suburbs.79 While Buchanan
acknowledged that such a deliberate policy strategy aimed at recruiting middleclass and affluent residents had the potential to exclude poor and minority
residents, he also reasoned that such policies “by preserving the fiscal base of
the community, may benefit the very groups that seem initially to be harmed.”80
Put another way, he theorized that the benefits that accrue from having
residents who can contribute to a city’s tax base would trickle down to poor and
minority residents. Similar arguments have been made by other scholars in
defense of urban localities adopting a middle-class recruitment strategy.81
Buchanan’s theory regarding affluent resident attraction is being put
into practice heavily during the resurgence of gentrification. Federal, state, and
local policies are being enacted explicitly to attract middle-class and more
affluent residents to cities.82 The two primary ways in which government
policies are being utilized to aid in the resurgence of urban gentrification are
through policies aimed at spurring economic development and through housing
placement and finance policies.83 The roles that these policies are playing in
facilitating the resurgence of gentrification are discussed in turn.

76
See James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE 1, 13–16
(1971).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See generally Douglas W. Rae, Two Cheers for Very Unequal Incomes, in JUSTICE AND
THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 105, 106 (Clarissa Rile Hayward & Todd Swanstrom eds., 2011)
(suggesting that “those . . . who want better life chances for low-earning households in major
cities should set out to increase inequality by attracting and keeping high [income] earners, now
greatly underrepresented in central city populations”).
82
See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 12 (noting that “[m]any cities pursue
revitalization policies with the expressed intention of providing incentives for middle- and highincome families to move into distressed communities, or inducements for original residents to
upgrade their homes”).
83
See generally powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 454 (“While the restructuring of the
national system of housing finance opens up home mortgages to low- and moderate-income
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1. Policies Aimed at Spurring Economic Development
At the state and local level, economic development policies are being
enacted with the deliberate goal of luring middle-class and affluent individuals
and businesses to urban inner-cities. One of the most prominent policy tools
being used to attract residents are tax incentives that take the form of tax credits
or abatements.84 For example, in Philadelphia, residents who choose to reside
in new urban construction or renovated buildings are given a 10-year tax
abatement.85 The tax abatement program “holds the tax assessment at a
property’s predevelopment level for 10 years.”86 Arguably as a result of the tax
abatement program, Philadelphia, which was previously in the midst of a 40year decline in population, saw its population increase significantly.87
Favorable tax policies enacted in gentrifying cities such as San Francisco and
Atlanta are also arguably causing significant increases in gentrification in those
cities.88
In addition to tax incentives, state and local governments are utilizing
their police power as an economic development tool to facilitate gentrification.
They do so through strategic enforcement of housing codes.89 Targeted

households, it also has ‘unleased powerful gentrification forces.’”); Wyly & Hammel, supra note
7, at 720–23.
84
See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 12–13 (describing the various tax
abatements and incentives that are given by state and local governments to spur home and condo
purchases in urban areas); Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High
Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayersbankroll-corporations.html?pagewanted=all (noting that “states, counties and cities are giving up
more than $80 billion each year to companies” in an effort to induce companies to remain in or
relocate to urban cities in an effort to create jobs for residents).
85
See Lisa Chamberlain, Tax Breaks Drive a Philadelphia Boom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/realestate/08nati.html?pagewanted=all (describing the
impact of the tax abatement program on revitalizing the Center City area of Philadelphia and
noting that “from the time that tax abatements were passed, more than 8,000 converted and new
units will have been added to Center City, and half of all new residents benefiting from tax
abatements came from outside the city”); Tax Abatement, OFF. OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.,
http://www.phila.gov/ohcd/taxabate.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
86
Chamberlain, supra note 85.
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 12–13 (“In San Francisco, the favorable
tax treatment of live/work lofts, totaling in the tens of millions of dollars is believed to have been
an important factor in the development of large numbers of . . . upper income units in the South
of Market area.”).
89
See, e.g., DIANE K. LEVY, JENNIFER COMEY & SANDRA PADILLA, KEEPING THE
NEIGHBORHOOD AFFORDABLE: A HANDBOOK OF HOUSING STRATEGIES FOR GENTRIFYING AREAS
13
(2006),
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/keeping-neighborhood-affordable
(discussing the ways in which housing code enforcement can be used to preserve affordable
housing or displace residents and noting that “[i]n gentrifying areas, an agency might over-
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enforcement (or lack thereof) of housing codes can make a neighborhood more
(or less) attractive to the type of development that spurs gentrification.90 State
and local governments also use other policy tools to further gentrification, such
as constructing new sports stadiums, museums, restaurants, and shopping
centers that cater to the interests of the middle-class and the affluent in an
attempt to draw them to the city.91
2. Housing Policies
At the federal level, changes to national housing policies are playing a
substantial role in the recent resurgence of gentrification. Most notably, in an
effort to increase homeownership, the federal government put policies in place
to expand the secondary mortgage market.92 In particular, in 1992 Congress
passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act
(“FHEFSSA”) which required Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) to
increase their acquisition of residential loans to low-income and minority
borrowers.93 The FHEFSSA also established affordable housing goals which
required GSEs to promote home ownership for low- and moderate-income
families and for any borrower in an “underserved area,” regardless of their
income level.94 The term “underserved area” was defined in such a way that it
captured a large number of urban neighborhoods. Case in point, the definition
section of the FHEFSSA includes language that allows the term “underserved
area” to mean an area with an African-American and Hispanic population of at
least 30%.95 Some scholars suggest that the “underserved area” definition,
enforce to further neighborhood revitalization and increase displacement pressures on lowerincome households”).
90
See, e.g., Kennedy & Leonard, supra note 10, at 14 (“In San Francisco, observers argue
that lax code enforcement has encouraged the construction of thousands of upper-income
live/work lofts in gentrifying neighborhoods.”).
91
See id. (“In Washington, D.C., the two hottest gentrifying areas surround a newly opened
subway station (Columbia Heights) and a new convention center (Shaw).”); McFarlane, supra
note 17, at 16 (describing how consumption policy strategies such as “[t]ailor[ing] land use and
development to meet the consumption tastes of people with money to spend by building
entertainment venues, convention centers, festival marketplaces, ethnic and historical festivals,
sports stadiums, hotels, restaurants, shopping, and bars (both coffee and alcohol)” facilitate
gentrification).
92
See powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 449–50.
93
12 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4642 (2014); see also Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 247
(describing the impact of the FHEFSSA on urban gentrification).
94
12 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(1) (“To increase the liquidity of mortgage investments and improve
the distribution of investment capital available for mortgage financing for underserved markets,
each enterprise shall provide leadership to the market in developing loan products and flexible
underwriting guidelines to facilitate a secondary market for mortgages . . . .”).
95
See Stuart A. Gabriel & Stuart S. Rosenthal, The Government-Sponsered Enterprises, the
Community Reinvestement Act, and Home Ownership in Targeted Underserved Neighborhoods,
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along with the mandates in the FHEFSSA for GSEs to increase their acquisition
of loans to low-income and minority borrowers, allowed capital to easily flow
into urban areas.96 The flow of capital into urban areas is theorized as
accelerating gentrification because it allows for the building of an infrastructure
that makes the area more attractive to middle- and upper-class residents. 97 Put
another way, the so-called desirable residents follow the capital into the city
which results in gentrification.
In addition, federal government policies related to housing assistance
for the poor are also helping to facilitate gentrification. Beginning in the 1930s,
the federal government gave funds to local governments to provide and operate
government-owned housing for the poor.98 Local governments were allotted
wide latitude in deciding where to site public housing buildings.99 Workingclass and middle-class residents often objected to having public housing
buildings located in their neighborhoods.100 As a result, local governments
almost exclusively sited public housing in poorer inner-city neighborhoods.101
This led to the geographic isolation of poor persons in public housing and
concentrated poverty.102
Concentrated poverty, scholars theorize, has pernicious side-effects,
particularly a lack of positive role models, increased criminal activity, and
maladjusted social behavior.103 Inspired by such theories regarding public

in HOUSING MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY 209 (2009) (noting that the FHEFSSA targeted
underserved communities and in so doing defined the proportion of each GSE’s annual loan
purchases that must derive from lower-income borrowers, borrowers residing in lower-income
communities, and borrowers in certain “high minority” neighborhoods or “underserved areas”).
96
See, e.g., Wyly & Hammel, supra note 35, at 247.
97
See Neil Smith, Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by
Capital, Not People, 45 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 538, 547 (1979) (concluding that gentrification is
spurred by people taking advantage of the return of capital to the city).
98
See United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437–1440 (2013); Alexander von
Hoffman, A Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of The Housing Act of 1949, 11
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 299, 302 (2000) (noting that “[t]he Housing Act of 1937 established a
federal public housing authority to make loans, grants, and annual contributions to local public
housing agencies to develop, acquire, and manage housing projects”).
99
See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and
Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1292 (1995) (noting
that the federal-local structure of public housing placed the decision of where to locate public
housing in the hands of local governments).
100
See von Hoffman, supra note 98, at 315 (“Working- and middle-class people objected,
sometimes violently, to the development of housing projects in their neighborhoods.”).
101
See id. (“In response to site controversies, housing authorities built new housing projects
near old ones, thus concentrating public housing in certain working- and lower-class areas of the
city.”).
102
See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
103
See Schill & Wachter, supra note 99, at 1289.
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housing and concentrated poverty, a movement ensued to eliminate public
housing buildings and to deconcentrate poverty by dispersing persons residing
in public housing buildings.104 Through the Housing Opportunities for
Everyone (“HOPE”) VI program, public housing projects were demolished and
residents were provided with vouchers to pay their rent in privately owned
buildings.105 The HOPE VI program also encouraged privatization of formerly
public housing projects through the forming of relationships with developers to
build mixed-income housing developments, purportedly as a way to remedy the
ill effects of the poor being geographically isolated in public housing
projects.106
Mixed-income housing was supposed to replace the previously
demolished public housing units. In many cases, however, the housing stock
was either not replaced or not replaced in high enough numbers to allow
significant numbers of prior public housing residents to be placed in the new
mixed-income developments.107 Further, while HOPE VI aimed to
deconcentrate poverty by relocating former public housing residents to higher
income areas, source of income discrimination—a phenomenon in which
landlords lawfully declined to accept the vouchers that Hope VI residents
received to assist them in paying their rent—was prevalent.108 As a result, it
was often nearly impossible for the former public housing residents to relocate
anywhere within the city, causing them to leave the city altogether.109 The exit
of poor people along with increasing land where public housing projects once

104

See 42 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1)–(4) (2013); SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI:
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 14 (2004), http://www.urban.org/research/pub
lication/decade-hope-vi (“A central premise of HOPE VI—and of the broader public housing
transformation effort that began in the 1990s—was that the overconcentration of profoundly
poor, nonworking households was a major contributor to the high levels of social problems in
distressed public housing.”).
105
POPKIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 14 (describing a central focus of HOPE VI as helping
residents relocate to better neighborhoods).
106
See id. at 15.
107
See Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: Lessons
Learned from the D.C. Housing Authority’s Hope VI Projects, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 353, 360 (2001).
108
See Danya E. Keene & Arline T. Geronimus, “Weathering” HOPE VI: The Importance of
Evaluating the Population Health Impact of Public Housing Demolition and Displacement, 88 J.
URB. HEALTH 417, 421 (2011) (finding that one of the challenges that the HOPE VI program
faced in successfully relocating residents to better neighborhoods was the lack of incentive by
landlords to accept vouchers in a tight rental market and general discrimination against voucher
holders by landlords).
109
See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 361 (noting that deconcentration did not make sense
in a market where the poor face tremendous obstacles in finding housing anywhere).
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stood paved the way for private development.110 The private development in
turn attracted middle- and upper-class residents, thereby resulting in
gentrification.111
C. The Consequences of Gentrification
The economic development and housing policies described above are
achieving varying levels of success in luring middle-class residents and
businesses to urban cities. As noted by other scholars, as a result of these policy
interventions, many urban cities are undergoing a spatial, social, racial, and
economic transformation that has important ramifications for both new and old
residents.112 The assessment of whether gentrification is ultimately beneficial
varies wildly depending upon the lens through which the benefits and
drawbacks are weighed.
On the one hand, some argue that gentrification provides much needed
economic stability to declining urban cities by increasing their tax base and
ensuring that public services are improved.113 Such improvements purportedly
benefit the city as a whole, including poor and minority residents.114 Put
another way, supporters of gentrification suggest that the rising tide of
gentrification lifts all boats. The influx of middle-class and affluent white
residents is thought to trickle down to the original low-income minority
residents who were previously stuck in an area with subpar conditions, but who
lacked the economic, political, and social capital to remedy the conditions prior
to the arrival of middle-class and affluent white gentrifiers.115

110
See Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Jonathan Brooks, City Redevelopment Policies and the
Criminalization of Homelessness: A Narrative Case Study, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT 75, 94–95 (Kevin Fox Gotham ed., 2001).
111
See Smith, supra note 97, at 547 (suggesting that people follow capital into cities, thereby
accelerating gentrification).
112
See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 17, at 26 (“The urban spatial restructuring taking place in
cities is called gentrification as it applies to neighborhoods that are changing. The term
restructuring keeps us focused on the fact that there is a deliberate, as well as structural,
dimension to the changes taking place in the city.”); powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 437–42
(describing the racial and economic transformations that occur in cities as a result of
gentrification).
113
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 30, at 405–06 (arguing that gentrification is good for all urban
residents of gentrifying areas because “increases in the number of affluent and well-educated
residents is plainly good for cities, on balance, by increasing the number of residents who can
pay taxes, purchase local goods and services, and support the city in state and federal political
processes”).
114
Id. at 406.
115
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Rhetoric and Realities of Gentrification: Reply to powell and
Spencer, 46 HOW. L.J. 491, 494 (2003) (“A central aspect of my argument is that the market will
not provide adequate low-income housing in cities, that more public funds must be made
available, and that gentrification creates wealth that can be taxed to provide this housing.”);
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Critics of gentrification on the other hand suggest that gains to
gentrified urban areas do not trickle down to the original residents, particularly
poor and minority residents.116 Instead, critics suggest that gentrification causes
displacement of original residents and that the benefits of gentrification accrue
almost exclusively to the middle- and upper-class and typically white
residents.117 While the actual evidence regarding resident displacement caused
by gentrification is contested and subject to much debate,118 there is little
question that gentrification causes changes to communities and that the original
residents of those neighborhoods bear a tremendous burden in adapting to those
changes.119 As discussed in the next section, gentrification of urban areas has
important implications for public schools similar to those that exist with respect
to gentrification in the broader sense.
III. GENTRIFICATION AND URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In addition to the economic development and housing policies, this
Article takes the position that the current resurgence of gentrification is being
further fueled by the enactment of local public school reforms. This is the case
because the residents driving the resurgence of gentrification tend to be young
middle-class white professionals120 who enter urban cities—at least initially—
without children or with small children who are not school-aged.121
Conventional wisdom previously held that once this demographic had children,
they would either send their children to private school or “concede to the
suburban dream and move to an area with a better school system.”122 This is no
Andres Duany, Three Cheers for “Gentrification,” AM. ENTERPRISE 37, 38 (2001)
(“Gentrification usually benefits the present owners. They receive better prices for their homes if
they sell. If they remain, there is a general improvement in quality of life as a result of improved
consumer services, higher tax bases, and the beneficial effects of middle-class vigilance over
municipal services.”).
116
See powell & Spencer, supra note 29, at 434 (arguing that gentrification is not good for
the poor or for the city as a whole and that the state manipulates the housing market in favor of
gentrifiers and is not poised to use gentrification to redistribute resources to help poor minority
residents).
117
See id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
While whites are commonly seen as the primary agents of gentrification, Blacks and other
minorities can also be gentrifiers. See, e.g., Loretta Lees, A Reappraisal of Gentrification:
Towards a “Geography of Gentrification,” 24 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 389, 403 (2000)
(noting that Blacks and Latinos are often portrayed as the victims of gentrification but that they
too can be gentrifiers in predominantly poor minority communities). However, for purposes of
this Article, the focus lies on gentrification by predominantly white residents, as understandings
regarding the impacts of non-white gentrification are still rather nascent and developing.
121
See CUCCHIARA, supra note 9, at 202–06.
122
McFarlane, supra note 17, at 15.
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longer automatically the case. While urban schools in most gentrifying areas
are still undoubtedly predominately minority and poor, an increasing number of
young middle-class white residents with children are deciding to give the urban
public schools a chance.123 Some local officials see this as an opportunity to
retain white middle-class residents with children who would otherwise leave
the city for suburban schools. They recognize however, that in order to attract
such gentrifiers to urban public schools, changes to the school system must be
made.124
This section examines a budding connection between some urban
public school reforms and efforts by localities to sustain gentrification. It
briefly describes the current conditions of urban public schools and how white
middle-class flight from urban schools helped to create these conditions. It then
examines the ways in which urban public school reform efforts have shifted
away from judicially-based reforms to more choice and market-oriented
reforms. It concludes by documenting the ways in which choice and marketoriented reforms are being used to entice gentrifiers to enroll their children in
urban schools and discussing the consequences of those efforts for poor and
minority students.
A. Middle-Class White Flight and Declining Urban Public School
Conditions
Just as white middle-class flight decimated urban cities, white middleclass flight also decimated urban public schools. Due to the loss of middle-class
and white residents and their children from urban cities, the majority of urban
schools have a student population in which the majority of students are poor
and minority.125 As other scholars have noted, the absence of middle-class

123

See, e.g., Tara Malone, More Families Sticking with City and Private Schools on North
and Northwest Sides, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-0719/news/ct-met-chicago-parents-stay-put-20110731_1_private-schools-enrollment-magnet
(suggesting that Chicago “Mayor Rahm Emanuel, focused early on improving public education
offerings as a lifeblood for economic growth”).
124
See Maia Bloomfield Cucchiara, Cities Are Trying to Fix Their Schools by Luring the
Middle Class: It Won’t Work, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2013/10/cities-are-trying-to-fix-their-schools-by-luring-the-middle-class-itwont-work/280390/ (describing an initiative between Philadelphia business and education leaders
to improve Philadelphia public schools and market the high performing schools to middle-class
parents in the Center City District).
125
See GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, CIV. RTS. PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 15 (2014), http://civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat
-and-an-uncertain-future (analyzing student enrollment data and finding that the majority of
students in central city or urban school districts are Black and Latino and that more than 90% of
students in the majority of Black and Latino schools are classified as low-income); James E.
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students and racial diversity within urban public schools has important
implications for the quality of education that students receive in urban public
schools.126
For example, public schools that lack middle-class students often have
unequal access to important educational inputs such as quality teachers and
curriculum.127 This is true of many urban schools as they consistently have
teachers with lesser accreditations than suburban teachers and often offer fewer
advanced placement or college level curriculum.128 Further, poor students tend
to have more social and academic needs due to the effects of concentrated
poverty.129 As a result, it costs more to effectively educate students in a school
in which the majority of students are poor.130 Yet, as a result of the limited tax
base that exists in many urban cities, urban public schools typically suffer from
inadequate funding relative to the needs of their student population.131 Finally,
the amalgamation of racial isolation and high levels of poverty in urban schools
arguably is amongst the reasons that students in urban public schools perform
significantly worse on indicators of academic achievement than students in

Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 272 (1999) (“Urban schools are attended
primarily by African-American and Hispanic students.”).
126
For a comprehensive examination of the negative effects of racially and economically
segregated schools, see GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIV. RTS. PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION
MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY (2005), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/rese
arch/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/why-segregation-matters-poverty-and-educationalinequality.
127
See Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 409–10 (2012) (noting the resources
schools with predominately middle-class student bodies have that schools with more low-income
students do not have).
128
See, e.g., Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School
Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1629 (2007) (arguing that teachers in low-income
urban schools are “often less qualified, lower paid, and may be overwhelmed in classrooms with
a disproportionate number of at-risk students”); Myrna Mandlawitz, A Tale of 3 Cities: Urban
Perspectives on Special Education, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y 1, 28 (2003), http://www.cepdc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=115 (finding that general education teachers in urban
areas are often not qualified in the subjects they teach).
129
See Black, supra note 127, at 411 (“[T]he need for intensive instructional and social
service programs tends to be significantly higher in high-poverty schools.”).
130
See Ryan, supra note 125, at 285 (“[S]chools with large concentrations of impoverished
students will face the greatest educational costs, even before factoring in such additional services
as security or counseling, and even without considering the different prices for educational goods
and services in cities as opposed to suburbs or rural areas.”).
131
See Wilson, supra note 70, at 1422 (describing the ways in which school district boundary
lines dictate funding resources and noting that “school districts in poorer, typically predominately
minority localities have fewer resources and educational inputs to offer relative to the need of
their students”).
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suburban schools.132 The combination of all of these issues results in most
urban schools being categorized as low quality schools.
Efforts to improve the aforementioned conditions in urban public
schools, particularly the racial and socioeconomic isolation, have and continue
to be made through both the judicial and legislative branches at the state and
federal level. For much of the mid- to late 20th century, attempts were made
through federal school desegregation litigation.133 Importantly however, in
most urban cities, racial isolation in schools is caused by residential racial
segregation between the suburbs and urban cities rather than de jure school
segregation policies.134 As a result, in order to racially integrate urban schools
in any meaningful way, courts would have to allow for a desegregation order
between a suburban and urban school system.
Unfortunately, the possibility of a court issuing such a desegregation
order was for all practical purposes foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding
in Milliken v. Bradley (“Milliken I”).135 There, the Court found that a federal
district court could not require an inter-district school desegregation plan
between a suburban school system and city school system to be implemented
unless there was proof of an inter-district violation.136 Put another way, the
court in Milliken I required proof that “racially discriminatory acts of one or
more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district” before it
would issue an inter-district desegregation order.137 This is a very difficult
standard to meet. Indeed, only a handful of courts have ordered an inter-district
desegregation since the Court’s decision in Milliken I.138
In light of Milliken I and the realities of racial segregation in urban
schools, many legal advocates shifted away from attempting to racially
integrate urban public schools and instead focused on school funding in an

132

See Ryan, supra note 125, at 286–93.
See generally Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan
Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825 (1996).
134
It is important to note however, that residential segregation between the suburbs and urban
cities was very much caused by explicit federal, state, and local policies. Yet the Supreme Court
does not recognize this state action as sufficient to trigger court mandated school desegregation
orders. See generally Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality Through the No
Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 625, 649–51 (2011)
(analyzing the ways in which explicit government policies caused racial residential segregation in
the suburbs and urban cities).
135
418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
136
Id. at 741–43.
137
Id. at 745.
138
See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 433
(8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1117 (7th Cir. 1980);
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1978), superseded by statute, 14 DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, § 1004 (2015); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1359 (6th Cir.
1974) (per curiam).
133
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effort to make sure racially and economically segregated urban schools were at
least appropriately funded.139 This approach found only moderate success.
Several state courts have issued orders finding that local systems of public
school finance violate state constitutional provisions regarding a student’s
fundamental right to an education.140 However, most state courts also tend to
take a very limited view of their remedial authority. They often decline to order
remedies that require state legislatures to make specific budgetary
allocations.141 Instead, they emphasize that judicial intervention in the state
budgeting process is warranted only in very limited circumstances. 142 As a
result, state legislatures are often left with wide discretion to craft funding
schemes. In turn, all too often state legislatures create schemes that are
insufficient at remedying funding disparities and inadequacies.143 Thus, the
combination of school-desegregation litigation and challenges to the ways in
which states fund urban schools has done little to improve racial isolation and
inadequate resources in urban public schools.

139

See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative
Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 553 (1998) (attributing the shift from equity theory to adequacy
theory in school-finance litigation to state court decisions’ inability to materially affect
centralization or total education spending).
140

Id. at 571.
See, e.g., Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1156–58 (Mass. 2005)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (declining to order a cost study pertaining to educational inadequacies
in part because of the “difficult issue of forcing the Legislature to appropriate more money” and
therefore finding that the state was not violating the Massachusetts Constitution’s education
clause by not providing an adequate education to students); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006) (reversing the court of appeals’s directive to the state
legislature to calculate the cost of a sound basic education for New York public school students,
reasoning that “[t]he role of the courts is not, as Supreme Court assumed, to determine the best
way to calculate the cost of a sound basic education in New York City schools, but to determine
whether the State’s proposed calculation of that cost is rational”).
142
See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 59 (“Judicial intervention in the
state budget ‘may be invoked only in the narrowest of instances.’” (quoting Wein v. Carey, 362
N.E.2d 587, 592 (N.Y. 1977))); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176
S.W.3d 746, 785, 792 (Tex. 2005) (finding that the system of school financing did not violate the
education provision of the Texas state Constitution and reasoning that “[i]f the Legislature’s
choices are informed by guiding rules and principles properly related to public education—that
is, if the choices are not arbitrary—then the system does not violate the constitutional
provision”).
143
See Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 755, 758 (2004) (arguing that even when state legislatures increase funding for all public
schools, most school funding legislation does not place a cap on how much districts can spend on
students thereby allowing wealthier districts to continue to drastically outspend poorer districts).
141
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B. The Rise of Market-Based Public School Reforms
Faced with a federal judiciary that has seemingly receded from the
business of mandating racial integration in urban schools along with state
judiciaries that are often unwilling to go far enough in ensuring adequate
funding for urban schools, those looking to improve urban public schools are
now more likely to look outside of the federal or state judiciary. Significantly,
non-judicial attempts to reform urban school conditions rely heavily on the
theory that infusing market-based principles into urban public school systems is
the answer to improving urban public schools.144
This line of reasoning suggests that poor and minority parents and
students in urban schools should have agency in the form of school choice to
improve the educational opportunities available to them, just as affluent and
white suburban parents typically have.145 It further theorizes that public schools
should have to compete for students just as business and private schools
compete for consumers.146 Introducing such competition is said to be an
effective way to compel public schools to relinquish the geographical
monopoly that they currently have on students and to hold them accountable to
students and parents.147 Under this model, schools that fail to offer quality
education will lose the competition for students and cease to exist.148 The
model further proposes that schools should have the ability to be innovative and
flexible so that parents can choose from a variety of different types of schools
that would best suit their child.149
To that end, most public school reforms currently being used to
improve urban schools follow what this Article refers to as “market-based
reforms.” These are reforms that promote free-market principles—such as

144
See Pauline Lipman & David Hursh, Renaissance 2010: The Reassertion of Ruling-Class
Power Through Neoliberal Policies in Chicago, 5 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 160, 162 (2007)
(suggesting that most public school reforms are defined by a commitment to neoliberalism, or an
individual liberty, unfettered participation in the market, and a limited role for the state, and
noting that “the current educational emphasis on choice, competition, markets, standardized
testing and accountability[,]” particularly with respect to urban schools, is based on neoliberal
rationales).
145
See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Supreme Court’s Role in the Growing School Choice
Movement, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 37, 56–63 (2006) (noting the ways in which affluent parents are able
to exercise choice in schools through their residential location or paying for private school and
chronicling efforts to increase the choices available to poor minority families through school
vouchers, charter schools, and intradistrict school choice programs).
146
See Lipman & Hursh, supra note 144, at 167.
147
See Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48
B.C. L. REV. 909, 918–19 (2007) (“When the local district in which a parent lives is the only one
where a parent may send a child tuition free, each local school district is a monopoly provider.”).
148
Id. at 921–22.
149
See Lipman & Hursh, supra note 144, at 167–68.
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individual choice and competition—as a way to reform public schools. The
most prominent forms of market-based reforms include closing so-called
under-enrolled or poor performing traditional schools and increasing the
number of charter schools in urban areas.150
Market-based reforms initially gained momentum at the federal level.
Federal officials adopted market-based reforms as a means of reducing
achievement gaps between minority and poor students and white middle-class
students.151 Two pieces of federal public education reform legislation in
particular, the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”)152 and the Race to the Top
initiative,153 laid the groundwork for the market-based public school reforms
that are now filtering down to the state and local level.
NCLB incorporates market-based reforms by requiring schools to make
Adequate Yearly Progress (“AYP”) towards academic proficiency for all
students, as measured by the students’ performance on standardized tests.154 If a
school fails to make AYP for two consecutive years it must allow students the
choice of transferring to another public school.155 It also requires schools that
fail to make AYP for five consecutive years to surrender control to the state,
which then has the option of closing the school and reopening it as a charter
school.156 While there is evidence to suggest that few schools have been closed

150
See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1723, 1772–73 (2012) (chronicling the failure of traditional civil rights litigation to
improve racial integration in and quality of urban public schools and the embrace of charter
schools as an alternative to improving education for minority students); Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Disparate Impact, School Closures, and Parental Choice, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 290–92
(describing the increasing number of public school closures and noting that, “[p]arental choice
policies are . . . empowering parents to exit traditional public schools for charter schools . . .
[and] suppress[ing] public school enrollment in many urban districts”); Osamudia R. James, OptOut Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1115–16 (2014)
(describing the affinity towards charter schools as being rooted in part by “the failure of
integration to close the achievement gap, the white flight that many desegregation plans
prompted, and the negative racial incidents to which students of color are subjected”).
151
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2013) (noting in the NCLB statement of purpose that a goal
of the Act is to “clos[e] the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children,
especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers”); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE
TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2009), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/
executive-summary.pdf (stating that a primary purposes of the Race to the Top Initiative is to
“achiev[e] significant improvement in student outcomes, including making substantial gains in
student achievement, closing achievement gaps”).
152
Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
153
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 1.
154
20 U.S.C. § 6316(a)(1)(A).
155
Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E).
156
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i).
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directly as a result of the NCLB school closure option, states are independently
adopting their own accountability statutes that mirror NCLB, closing schools
pursuant to those statutes, and replacing them with charter schools.157 Thus,
NCLB’s focus on closing underperforming schools and replacing them with
charter schools significantly contributed to the ongoing movement to reform
urban public education by replacing traditional public schools with charter
schools.158
The second piece of federal legislation, the Race to the Top initiative,
is a competitive grant funding program that awards grants to states if they,
among other things, “ensur[e] successful conditions for high-performing
charters and other innovative schools.”159 This funding provision incorporates
market-based reforms by encouraging the expansion of charter schools.160
Indeed, many states are following suit by amending their charter-enabling
provisions to make it easier to establish charter schools.161 As discussed in
further detail in the next section, the market-based reforms encouraged at the
federal level are paving the way for wholesale urban public school reform at
the local level. The reforms are being used at the local level, at least in part, to
make urban public schools more attractive for gentrifying families.
C. The Connection Between Urban Public School Reforms and
Gentrification
While market-based public school reforms for the most part
proliferated at the federal level, because of a strong adherence to localism in
American public education, the reforms are executed by local government

157

See JENNIFER MCMURRER & SHELBY MCINTOSH, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, STATE
IMPLEMENTATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF TITLE I SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS UNDER THE
RECOVERY ACT 2 (2012), http://www.cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=398; U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT:
VOLUME IX—ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER NCLB: FINAL REPORT (2010), https://www2.ed.gov/rschs
tat/eval/disadv/nclb-accountability/nclb-accountability-final.pdf.
158
See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the
Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 24 (2010) (“[E]fforts to
improve the academic performance of the nation’s public schools revitalized the school-choice
movement regarding public charter schools.”).
159
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 3.
160
Id. at 11 (listing as a criterion for receiving a Race to the Top grant that “[t]he State has a
charter school law that does not prohibit or effectively inhibit increasing the number of highperforming charter schools”).
161
See Education Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx (last visited Nov.
5, 2015) (noting the number of states that have enacted or amended their state charter laws to
allow for the expansion in the number of charter schools).
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officials.162 At the local level, local government officials often share the goal of
using market-based reforms to close achievement gaps and increase the quality
of schools available to students. In many gentrifying urban areas, however,
local officials are also looking towards market-based reforms to increase the
quality of urban schools—or at least the perception surrounding the quality of
urban schools—in order to retain and recruit middle class white gentrifiers with
school-aged children.163
Market-based reforms, particularly with their emphasis on creating
more parental and student choice, are part of a legitimate attempt to improve
urban school systems that are often in dire need of repair.164 Indeed, the closing
of failing or underutilized traditional public schools and expansion of charter
schools is supposed to help improve the educational opportunities available to
all students, including poor and minority students. Similar to the theory
regarding gentrification being the tide which raises all boats, some suggest that
enacting market-based, public school reforms as a means to keep middle-class
white families in public school systems will benefit all students in urban school
systems.165
To be sure, the greatest benefit that getting middle-class white
gentrifiers to enroll their children in urban public schools brings is the ability to
reintegrate urban schools which are now hyper-segregated as a result of
middle-class white flight to suburban school districts.166 The benefits of
162

For a discussion of how localism in the American system of public education works, see
Wilson, supra note 134, at 632–35.
163

See, e.g., Barras, supra note 16, at 2 (describing former D.C. Chancellor of Schools
Michelle Rhee’s attempts to recruit parents and noting that the places within Washington, D.C.,
where Rhee’s recruitment attempts were most focused, tended to be “gentrified locales where
demographics have shifted . . . but neighborhood schools remain overwhelmingly AfricanAmerican”); CENT. PHILA. DEV. CORP. & CTR. CITY DIST., GROWING SMARTER: THE ROLE OF
CENTER CITY’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN ENHANCING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF PHILADELPHIA 6 (2004),
http://www.centercityphila.org/docs/growingsmarterreport2004.pdf (“A generation ago, young
professionals fled with their families to the suburbs. Philadelphia’s public schools now have a
historic opportunity to capitalize on a decade of positive change, to ensure the sustainability of
Center City’s remarkable revival and to retain a larger percentage of Philadelphia residents with
college degrees.”).
164
See, e.g., Davis & Oakley, supra note 20, at 99 (finding that the emergence of charter
schools in gentrifying areas is a tool of both urban revitalization efforts and legitimate attempts at
school reform).
165
See, e.g., STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 1 (arguing that the “arrival of the children of the
gentry” has the potential to improve racial segregation and poverty which contribute to poor
learning outcomes in urban schools); Emily Badger, How Diverse Schools Could Help Fight the
Worst Effects of Gentrification, CITYLAB (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2013/
04/how-diverse-schools-could-help-fight-worst-effects-gentrification/5294/ (suggesting that
gentrification “raises the possibility—albeit a fleeting one —that long-segregated schools in
urban American might finally, if uneasily integrate”).
166
See GARY ORFIELD, JOHN KUCSERA & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 41–42

706

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

attending racially and economically integrated schools have long been
documented.167 Thus, market-based reforms that are successful in increasing
racial and economic balance in urban public schools have the potential to
benefit poor and minority students as well. Such reforms are necessary because
gentrifiers often cite the state of urban public schools as the primary reason
they would consider leaving the city.168 In contrast, middle-class white parents
who decide to remain in urban areas often express a desire to have a
marketplace of public school options so that in the event their neighborhood
school is low quality, they can shop outside of their neighborhood school for a
better school for their child.169
Operating under the premise that market-based reforms will improve
public schools in ways that will entice gentrifiers to send their kids to urban
public schools, local officials are expanding upon the types of market-based
school reforms contained in the Race to the Top Initiative and NCLB
legislation, at least in part this Article suggests, to make their school systems
more attractive for gentrifying families. The market-based reforms being
implemented in gentrifying cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington,
D.C., provide illustrative examples of the ways in which market-based reforms
are being used to cater to the interests of gentrifiers in an attempt to get them to
enroll their children in urban schools.
1. Chicago
Chicago is the birthplace of market-based public school reforms.
Indeed, several of the reforms adopted in the federal NCLB and Race to the

(2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlknational/e-pluribus. . .separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-morestudents/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf (finding that the typical white student
attends a school where three quarters of their peers are white).
167
See, e.g., id. at 6–11 (describing the relationship between racially and economically
segregated schools and poor academic performance); Black, supra note 127, at 409–10
(documenting the benefits of racially and economically integrated schools, including more
advanced curricula, better teachers, and higher expectations for students).
168
See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Schools Dilemma for Urban Gentrifiers: Keep Their Kids
Urban, or Move to Suburbia?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/education/schools-dilemma-for-urban-gentrifiers-keep-their-kids-urban-or-move-tosuburbia/2012/10/14/02083b6c-131b-11e2-a16b-2c110031514a_story.html
(describing
the
decision-making process of a white, middle-class family who left Washington, D.C., for the
suburbs because of the condition of Washington, D.C., public schools).
169
See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1288 (2005) (reviewing ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN
TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE
(WITH SURPRISING SOLUTIONS THAT WILL CHANGE OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURES) (2004)) (suggesting
that incorporating a robust public choice program will increase the number of white, middle-class
families willing to enroll their children in urban public schools); Posey, supra note 5, at 12.
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Top Initiative began on a smaller scale in Chicago.170 In particular, in 2004 the
Chicago Board of Education passed an initiative called Renaissance 2010
(“Ren10”), an initiative that sought to transform public education through
innovative charter and contract schools.171 Importantly, when Ren10 was
created, local officials made an explicit connection between reforming the
schools through Ren10 and attracting new residents to parts of the city in which
public housing was being replaced with mixed-income housing.172 The stated
goal of the new schools was to “provide all families—regardless of their socioeconomic standing—with options for a high-quality public education.”173 The
new schools were given autonomy and independence, but in exchange they
were required to agree to higher levels of accountability, including having their
students’ achievement measured by a separate set of metrics in addition to
standardized tests.174
In order to open the new schools, Ren10 embarked on an aggressive
campaign to close low-performing schools.175 Eventually however, the
initiative morphed from closing low-performing schools to consolidating and
closing schools with low enrollment, even if the schools were academically
successful.176 While Ren10 is no longer in operation, the residue of Ren10
remains as numerous traditional Chicago public schools were closed, almost all
of which were in predominately Black and Latino neighborhoods.177

170
See Pauline Lipman, Contesting the City: Neoliberal Urbanism and the Cultural Politics
of Education Reform in Chicago, 32 STUD. CULTURAL POL. EDUC. 217–18 (2011) (describing
Chicago as the incubator of neoliberal education policies, particularly school closures and the
expansion of charter and contract schools, and describing the ways in which federal public school
reforms were modeled off of Chicago’s reforms).
171
See Renaissance 2010, CHI. PUB. SCHS., http://www.cps.edu/programs/districtinitiatives/
pages/renaissance2010.aspx (last modified Aug. 8, 2011).
172
Lipman, supra note 170, at 223 (noting that the Chicago Metropolitan Planning Council
made a direct connection between gentrification and the Ren10 formation with one official
stating that they should embark upon a plan to market the new schools created by Ren10 to
“parents considering moving into new mixed-income communities”).
173
KATIE FURTICK, REASON FOUND., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT 2014: EDUCATION 43
(2014), http://reason.org/files/apr-2014-education.pdf.
174
Id.
175
See Lipman, supra note 170, at 222.
176
See id.
177
See id. at 221–22 (noting that as of Spring 2010, Chicago Public Schools had consolidated
or phased out 59 schools and opened 92 schools: 46 of which were charter schools, 15 of which
were contract schools operated by private service providers, and 31 of which were Renaissance
public “performance” schools that operated with a five-year renewable performance contract).
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2. Philadelphia
In Philadelphia, the downtown Center City area is undergoing
significant gentrification.178 Local officials quickly realized that in order to
sustain the gentrification, changes had to be made to make the Philadelphia
public schools a more attractive option for gentrifiers with school-aged
children.179 As a result, Philadelphia school administrators and a local business
improvement district called Center City District (“CCD”) created a partnership
called the Center City Schools Initiative (“CCSI”). The stated purposes of the
CCSI were to (i) infuse business marketing schemes targeted towards the
professional workers in Center City and (ii) make changes to the school
system’s administrative- and student-assignment processes in order to keep
gentrifiers from leaving once their children reached school age.180
In order to accomplish its purpose, CCSI restructured the way in which
the Philadelphia public schools were organized. It created a new academic unit
within the Philadelphia Public School System called the Center City Region
(“CCR”).181 The CCR encompasses only schools in the gentrified City Center
area.182 Further, the CCR schools were “deliberately constructed and managed
to appeal to professional parents.”183 Indeed, the CCR schools were marketed to
middle- and upper-class parents by highlighting the CCR schools’ membership
within an elite cadre of the Philadelphia public school system.184 Center City
parents were also heavily recruited by CCR officials, including CCR officials
organizing elaborate dinner parties in which parents with children were invited
to attend and “pitched” to send their children to CCR schools.185
Finally, the school admission and assignment policy for the schools
within the CCR was changed so that children who reside in the CCR catchment

178

See CENT. PHILA. DEV. CORP. & CTR. CITY DIST., supra note 163, at 1 (“Center City has
become the preferred residence for the region’s young college-educated adults—future parents of
the region’s school children. More than 30% of Center City’s 80,000 residents—24,000 people—
are between the ages of 25 and 34. Seventy-nine percent of this group have a college degree, but
only 14% have children.”).
179
Id. (“Attracting recent college graduates is only half the battle. Retaining them—as they
become 35–44, have children, prosper in their professions, or succeed in their own businesses—
is key to Philadelphia’s prosperity.”).
180
See Maia Cucchiara, Re-branding Urban Schools: Urban Revitalization, Social Status,
and Marketing Public Schools to the Upper Middle Class, 23 J. EDUC. POL’Y 165, 165 (2008).
181
Id. at 167.
182
Id. at 169.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 171.
185
Id. at 171–74 (summarizing efforts to recruit parents to Grant Elementary School, a school
within the CCR, and noting the ways in which officials highlighted Grant’s unique position and
how one parent was so heavily recruited that she stated “I’ve never felt so recruited in my
life . . . . Like, I felt like if I had been an athlete, maybe I’d have gotten a car.”).
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zone had first preference.186 Thus admission to CCR schools, which are the
better performing schools in the city, for students living outside the CCR
catchment zone, now occurs on a very limited basis.187 Although the CCR was
dissolved in 2010, the marketing campaign combined with the changed
admission policy had long-term effects on the demographics of Philadelphia
public schools.188 The net result of the CCR was essentially the creation of a
network of public schools within the Philadelphia public school system almost
exclusively for the children of middle- and upper-class (and predominately
white) gentrifiers.189 Similar changes to the school admission and assignment
processes for the benefit of middle- and upper-class gentrifiers are also being
made in other gentrifying urban cities. 190
3. Washington, D.C.
Washington, D.C., is also undergoing significant gentrification.191
Similar to Philadelphia, reforming the public school system in order to make
schools more palatable to young gentrifying families is also part of

186

The school assignment process in Philadelphia was previously an open enrollment which
allowed students to enroll in schools outside of their catchment zone on a frequent basis.
187
Cucchiara, supra note 180, at 171.
188
Id. at 184 (noting that after the dissolution of the CCR, “district data on student enrollment
show that it had a significant, and lasting, impact”).
189
Id. at 170 (noting that the creation of the CCD “with its unique educational market and
high-status location signaled that it was a place where schools, parents and students would
receive special treatment such as different rules and procedures around admissions, [and] a
higher profile for the district”).
190
See, e.g., Chase Billingham, Parental Choice, Neighborhood Schools, and the Market
Metaphor in Urban Education Reform, 52 URBAN STUD. 685, 691 (2015). Changes that were
made to Boston’s previous controlled choice school assignment policy which allowed poor
minority families to escape poor performing neighborhood schools by allowing them to attend
schools within a larger geographic assignment zone. Id. In 2013, a new system of neighborhood
schools was implemented and “[t]hroughout the process, many municipal and business leaders
drove home the argument that a return to neighborhood schools would prove instrumental in the
city’s quest to attract and retain . . . new profession families, who [had] frequently expressed
reluctance to live in the city lest their children be forced to attend an unacceptable public school.”
Id.
191
See Sabrina Tavernise, A Population Changes, Uneasily, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18dc.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (finding that in 2011,
Washington, D.C., lost its Black majority for the first time in 50 years and that the social fabric
and character of neighborhoods were being changed); Gerry Widdicombe, The Fall and Rise of
Downtown D.C., THE URBANIST (Jan. 2010) http://www.spur.org/publications/article/2010-0110/fall-and-rise-downtown-dc (describing the process by which downtown Washington, D.C.,
was transformed into a vibrant economic hub, noting the infusion of money from the private
sector, tax breaks and subsidies that were given in order to revitalize the downtown areas, and the
overall tax base of the District has increased).
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Washington, D.C.’s stated larger economic development strategy.192 In
Washington, D.C., as in many urban cities, an overwhelmingly Black public
school system decayed after years of disinvestment and failed efforts to reform
the school system through the courts.193 To be sure, the charter school
movement emerged in Washington, D.C., as an alternative to the chronically
failing schools.194 Yet local officials in Washington, D.C., are now openly
using charter schools not only as a method of reforming their public school
system, but also as a tool to attract and retain gentrifiers.195
For example, local officials implemented a program called City Build
which provided $1 million in funding for organizations to establish charter
schools in gentrifying areas.196 Notably, the stated impetus for the City Build
initiative was to attract and retain residents to the District with the hope of
helping the Washington, D.C., mayor meet his stated goal of drawing 100,000
new residents to the District.197 In addition, some parents in gentrifying
neighborhoods, particularly the gentrified Capitol Hill neighborhood, took

192

See, e.g., Barras, supra note 16, at 3 (describing how improvement in D.C. schools could
increase the number of white gentrifiers who remain in the city and the implications for D.C.’s
overall economy).
193
See Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding that the D.C. public schools still continued to segregate
students by race after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and requiring them to
make changes).
194
See Matthew M. Cregor, Continuing the Conversations: School Integration by Race and
Socioeconomic Status in Gentrifying Neighborhoods, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 595,
603–04 (2006) (noting that “D.C.’s frustrating educational history, congressional oversight, and
high national visibility have made it the battleground or breeding ground for a number of school
reform movements”).
195
Emma Brown, D.C. School Enrollment Increases, with Charters Growing Faster than
DCPS, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/overall-dcschool-enrollment-increases-with-charters-growing-faster-than-dcps/2013/10/17/0f8dd7fc-375e11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html (containing comments from Vincent Gray, D.C.’s Mayor,
stating that the increase of student enrollment in Washington, D.C.’s public schools evidenced
that they were a “great place” for families).
196
See Office of the Superintendent of Educ., City Build, DC.GOV,
http://osse.dc.gov/service/city-build (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“The aim of City Build stretches
beyond excellence in academics; it is a focus on encouraging community development,
promoting strategic neighborhoods, attracting and retaining residents, and creating partnerships
between public charter schools and community organizations.”).
197
See Cregor, supra note 194, at 596–97 (describing the City Build Initiative as “the best
near-term hope for attracting and retaining residents to the District, with the hope of helping to
meet Mayor Williams’s stated goal of attracting 100,000 new residents” (quoting Press Release,
District of Columbia, Sen. Landrieu, Mayor Williams Kick Off “City Build” Charter School
Initiative (Aug. 18, 2004))).
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matters into their own hands by creating a charter school for, and marketed
almost exclusively to, parents in the gentrified Capitol Hill area.198
In addition to charter school expansion, Washington, D.C., local
government officials and school officials recently changed the boundary lines
that determine student assignment to traditional public schools.199 The change
was driven at least in part by a desire to provide predictability and stability in
terms of school assignment for young families so that they would feel
comfortable sending their kids to Washington, D.C., public schools.200
D. The Impact of Market-Based Public School Reforms on Poor and
Minority Students
As the above examples in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and
Philadelphia
demonstrate,
market-based
public
school
reforms
disproportionately affect poor minority students. For gentrified families,
market-based reforms are for the most part a net positive. They actually work to
give the families more viable choices when navigating urban public school
systems with far too few high-quality options. Yet, market-based reforms
typically have the opposite effect on the options available to poor and minority
families. Instead of expanding the choices available to them, it constricts their
choices.
For example, the closing of traditional public schools is leaving many
predominantly poor and minority neighborhoods with no traditional public
schools within close proximity.201 In Chicago for example, a high number of
poor minority neighborhoods are now considered “school deserts” or

198

See Save Our Schs.- Se. & Ne. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-01500, 2006 WL 1827654, at
*1 (D.D.C. July 3, 2006) (“Two Rivers, which was granted its charter in 2003 and began
operating in Fall 2004, was assertedly founded by affluent white families who felt that the
District’s public school student body was ‘too black.’”); Cregor, supra note 194, at 605–08
(describing the efforts of parents in the Washington, D.C., Capitol Hill area to create their own
charter school because they were dissatisfied with the traditional public school offerings of the
D.C. public school system).
199
See D.C. ADVISORY COMM. ON STUDENT ASSIGNMENT, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICIES AND DCPS SCHOOL BOUNDARIES 14–19 (2014), http://dme.dc.
gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dme/publication/attachments/Final%20Recommendations%20on%
20Student%20Assignment%208-18-14_0.pdf.
200
Id. at 5 (“DC is currently in a period of child population growth across the city, but
whether young families will stay in the District, where families with children will settle, how
long families will stay, and how large the families will be will all have a tremendous effect on
DCPS and the public charter schools. In addition, the quality and character of public education in
the District of Columbia and of individual DCPS and charter schools will affect the residential
and school choices of these families.”).
201
See supra Part II.C.
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communities without public schools in close proximity.202 Public school
closures in predominately minority neighborhoods have the effect of
destabilizing those neighborhoods because schools are often one of the most
stable institutions in poor minority urban areas.203 Closing public schools in
already distressed, predominately poor, and minority neighborhoods often
leaves vacant buildings that can exacerbate blight in poor communities, and the
vacant buildings become a magnet for crime.204 Indeed, many of the closed
schools are not sold or repurposed for other uses.205 The remnants of the closed
physical buildings can also take a psychological toll on members of the
community, leading them to believe that their community was abandoned and
no longer worthy of investment.206 This can in turn cause people to leave their
communities, thereby depleting the neighborhood of critical social capital.
The closing of traditional neighborhood public schools is supposed to
be balanced out by the expansion of non-neighborhood based charter schools
that are of higher quality. However, the ability to actually attend high quality
charter schools often proves illusive for poor and minority students and parents.
Indeed, the better and more selective charter schools are often oversubscribed

202
See, e.g., Julianne Hing, Activists Say No to Another “School Desert” in Chicago,
COLORLINES (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/12/activists_say_no_
to_another_school_desert_in_chicago.html (describing the high number of school closings in
poor Black and Latino neighborhoods in Chicago and highlighting that the closure of public
schools in the South Side Chicago neighborhood of Bronzeville will lead to there being only one
public high school in close proximity for students to attend—a charter school two and a half
miles away from Bronzeville).
203
JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: RACISM, SCHOOL CLOSURES,
AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SABOTAGE 19 (2014), http://www.j4jalliance.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/02/J4JReport-final_05_12_14.pdf (noting that when public schools close “[r]esidents lose
community services housed in schools, such as pre-K programs, before- and after-school
programming, adult education classes, and health clinics. . . . Many of our communities
experience a massive outflow of economic and human capital, which they can ill afford
considering they were already substantially under-resourced.”).
204
See, e.g., John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned
Property Problem, 22 J. URB. AFF. 301, 303 (2000) (“Ample evidence exists to suggest that such
properties also have social ramifications, as they tend to serve as ‘magnets for crime’ and to
increase the risks of fire and vandalism in urban neighborhoods.”).
205
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, SHUTTERED PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE STRUGGLE TO BRING OLD
BUILDINGS NEW LIFE 1 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2013/02/11/Philad
elphia_School_Closings_Report.pdf?la=en (“Since 2005, the 12 districts have sold, leased or
reused a total of 267 properties and still have 301 unused sites on the market, empty buildings
that can cast a pall over their neighborhoods and be costly to seal, maintain and insure.”).
206
See Garnett, supra note 150, at 320 (summarizing anecdotal evidence to support claims
that “[r]esidents might interpret a school closure as signaling that their community is no longer
worthy of investment, especially when (as is frequently the case) demographic realities
concentrate school closures in minority neighborhoods”).
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and utilize a lottery process in order to gain admission.207 While in theory all
participants in the lottery have an equal opportunity to gain admission,
gentrifier families who tend to have more time, resources, and cultural capital
to navigate the lottery process are more likely to apply and gain admission to
the better charter schools.208
In fact, the majority of poor and minority students are more likely to
enroll in charter schools that perform equivalent to or worse than traditional
public schools.209 Importantly, as a result of a steady stream of closures, many
poor minority students are having to transfer to new schools multiple times
within a short time period because schools are at times slated for closure
shortly after accepting a batch of students from a previously closed school.210
Thus, the expansion of charter schools arguably favors the interests of
gentrifiers who are more likely to have the time and cultural capital to navigate
the lottery process and obtain admission into the best charter schools.
Closing traditional public schools and expanding the number of charter
schools also comes at a cost to traditional public schools. Traditional public
schools are much more likely to serve minorities, poor students, and students
with serious social and academic needs.211 Indeed, it is well documented that
charter schools tend to deny students with behavioral problems and students
with disabilities.212 Closing large numbers of traditional public schools means
that the few traditional public schools that remain open are forced to educate
students who have more social and academic needs, but the schools have less
money to do so because they lose state and local funding that follows students

207
See, e.g., Conor Williams, What Applying to Charter Schools Showed Me About
Inequality, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014
/03/what-applying-to-charter-schools-showed-me-about-inequality/284530/ (noting that in
Washington, D.C., the demand for quality seats greatly exceeded the supply and describing the
lottery process by which seats are allocated).
208
See, e.g., id. (describing how parents with more time and resources can increase their
chances of obtaining a coveted spot in the charter school lottery by applying to more schools and
having the ability to stand in line early in the morning to submit charter applications).
209
JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra 203, at 12.
210
Lipman, supra note 170, at 222 (noting that “[s]ome African-American students were
transferred to as many as four schools in three years as one school after another was closed, and
receiving schools were destabilized by the influx of dislocated students”).
211
JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra note 203, at 11–12 (“Many charter schools also exclude
students who are not perceived to be high-achievers or academically inclined. Charter schools
use a variety of selective admission techniques, such as targeted marketing strategies,
burdensome application processes, imposing academic prerequisites, and the active
discouragement of less-desirable candidates.”).
212
Id. at 12.
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to charter schools.213 Poor and minority students, not the children of gentrifiers,
are more likely to attend such under-resourced traditional public schools.
Finally, gentrifiers are more likely to live in a neighborhood that has
the best traditional public schools in the city.214 Thus, if they are unable to gain
admission to a quality charter school they are more likely to be able to exercise
their choice of enrolling in a traditional neighborhood public school. This is
especially true in gentrifying localities that have changed their school
enrollment policies to favor neighborhood school enrollment. For example, in
Washington, D.C., the boundary-line reassignment plan resulted in the
shrinking of the boundary lines in two of the fastest gentrifying parts of the
city.215
Indeed, the new attendance zones for the best performing middle and
high schools in the city were shrunk so that only residents in the adjacent,
predominately white, gentrified neighborhoods will have an automatic right to
enroll in those schools.216 On the other hand, students in the predominately
Black and poor Ward Seven section of the city217 were the most detrimentally
impacted by the new boundary line changes. Over “1,266 students will be

213

See, e.g., id.; Valerie Strauss, A Dozen Problems with Charter Schools, WASH. POST (May
20,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/05/20/a-dozenproblems-with-charter-schools/ (summarizing the financial consequences of students moving
from traditional public schools to charter schools and finding that “when a couple students leave
a classroom to attend a charter school, that classroom still has to keep the lights on, and pay the
teacher and the heating bill: the math is not a simple moving of dollars from one place to
another”).
214
See Japonica Brown-Saracino, Social Preservationists and the Quest for Authentic
Community, in THE GENTRIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 28, at 261, 277–83.
215
See Emma Brown, D.C. Releases New Boundaries Proposal with Emphasis on
Neighborhood Schools, WASH. POST (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
education/dc-releases-new-boundaries-proposal-with-emphasis-on-neighborhood-schools/2014/0
6/12/828e30b0-f245-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html?wpisrc=al_locmisc
(“Most
high
school boundaries would also shift significantly, with some of the biggest changes at schools in
the fastest-gentrifying parts of the city, such as Cardozo and Roosevelt. Cardozo’s zone, which
currently extends far into Northeast Washington, would become an entirely Northwest school,
encompassing wealthier neighborhoods around Dupont Circle and downtown that are currently
zoned to Wilson.”).
216
Michael Alison Chandler & Mike DeBonis, D.C. Mayor Gray Adopts New School
Boundary Recommendations, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/education/dc-mayor-gray-adopts-new-school-boundary-recommendations/2014/08/21/9
fed7d4a-249b-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html (“New attendance zones for Alice Deal
Middle and Woodrow Wilson High—two Northwest schools that are among the most indemand—are smaller, with some neighborhoods that had access to them now sent to other
schools.”).
217
See D.C. ACTION FOR CHILDREN, A TALE OF THREE CITIES: WHAT THE CENSUS SAYS
ABOUT THE DISTRICT AND HOW WE MUST RESPOND 4, 7 (2011), https://www.dcactionfor
children.org/sites/default/files/CensusBrief4-27-11%20FINAL_0.pdf (showing that Ward 7 has
the largest Black population (90%) in the city and the highest rate of poverty (over 40%)).
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reassigned to a new school and 945 will no longer have a choice” to attend a
neighborhood school.218 This contrasts starkly with the impact on the
predominately white and heavily gentrified Ward Three section of Washington,
D.C., where no student will be reassigned to a new public school.219 In an
attempt to mitigate the segregating effects of the new zone-assignment policy, a
limited number of seats in the highest performing schools in the city were set
aside for socio-economically disadvantaged students who can attempt to enroll
in those seats through the out-of-boundary lottery.220 The out-of-boundary
lottery, however, only offers a limited number of slots.221 Often the most
desirable schools have no seats available for students who enter the out-ofboundary lottery.222
In the end, market-based reforms create an interest divergence between
poor and minority families and students, on the one hand, and gentrifiers, on
the other. They do so by expanding the choices available to gentrifier families
while simultaneously constricting the choices available to poor and minority
families and students. Despite the harmful and racially disproportionate effects
of market-based reforms, they have thus far withstood legal challenge. As
discussed in the next section, market-based reforms are likely to continue to
withstand legal challenges and, as a result, legislative reforms may prove more
effective in meeting both the needs of poor and minority students and gentrifier
families.

218

Aaron Wiener, Who’s Affected by the School-Assignment Changes, WASH. CITY PAPER
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2014/0
8/21/whos-affected-by-the-school-assignment-changes/.
219
Id. (“Ward 3 will be the least affected, with no students reassigned.”).
220
See Chandler & DeBonis, supra note 216 (“[A]t-risk students should have a preference in
the lottery for 25 percent of all out-of-boundary seats in any given year in more-affluent
schools.”).
221
See D.C. PUB. SCHS., MY SCHOOL DC LOTTERY AND ENROLLMENT POLICY HANDBOOK 5
(2015),
http://dcps.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dcps/publication/attachments/Lottery%20
Policy%20Handbook4.pdf (describing the out-of-boundary lottery process as a lottery that allows
a student “[t]o access a school that is not a right-to-attend school, also referred to as an out-ofboundary school, in kindergarten through Grade 12”).
222
See, e.g., Bill Turque, DCPS Lottery: A Look at the Available Seats, WASH. POST (Feb. 6,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dc-schools-insider/post/dcps-lottery-a-look-at-theavailable-seats/2012/02/03/gIQABTIpuQ_blog.html (noting that there was zero to one seat
available, through the out-of-boundary lottery, in the majority of Washington, D.C.’s most
affluent and coveted public schools in the upper northwest section of the city).
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IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MARKET-BASED REFORMS IN GENTRIFYING
URBAN CITIES AND THE INTEREST DIVERGENCE DILEMMA
Poor minority students in gentrifying areas are bringing legal
challenges to market-based reform practices, particularly school closures and
charter school expansion.223
Advocates bringing challenges to public school closures and charter
school expansion have not made explicit the connection between gentrification
and localities’ use of market-based public school reforms as an economic
development tool to sustain gentrification.224 They are, however, challenging
the harmful effects that public school closures and charter school expansion
have on poor and minority students.225 To date, the legal challenges have not
been successful. This section provides an overview of the various legal
challenges made by advocates both in the courts and with administrative
agencies. It then analyzes the reasons why these challenges are either not
succeeding or are unlikely to succeed.
A. Court-Based Challenges to Market-Based Public School Reforms
The primary method of challenging the exclusionary effects of marketbased reforms thus far has been to seek relief from the courts or OCR. In
particular, plaintiffs are filing complaints with courts and OCR alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and various state-law antidiscrimination statutes.226
While many of the administrative actions are still pending and under review, as

223
Notably, the school assignment policy changes that favor a return to neighborhood schools
have not been subject to legal challenge. This is likely the case because courts have consistently
ruled that issues of school assignment, particularly the drawing of attendance zones, are within
the discretion of local officials and will not be disturbed absent compelling evidence of
intentional discrimination or other misconduct. See, e.g., Annotation, Discretion of
Administrative Officers as to Changing Boundaries of School District, 135 A.L.R. 1096 (1941).
224
See infra Part IV.A.
225
See infra Part IV.A.
226
John Hurdle, Education Dept. to Hear School Closing Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/education/education-department-to-hear-school-clos
ing-complaints.html?_r=0 (“The United States Department of Education is investigating
complaints that plans to close or reorganize public schools in Philadelphia, Detroit and Newark
discriminate against black and Hispanic students, as well as those with disabilities, a department
official confirmed on Monday.”); Valerie Strauss, Education Department Investigating Three
School Civil Rights Complaints, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/10/15/education-department-investigating-three-school-civil-rightscomplaints/ (“The Education Department’s Office of Civil Rights is investigating three
complaints filed on behalf of African American parents in New Orleans, Chicago and Newark
alleging racial discrimination in the closing of scores of neighborhood public schools in those
three cities.”).
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discussed further in Part IV.B below, this Article takes the position that the
administrative complaints are unlikely to prove fruitful in halting the use of
exclusionary market-based reforms. Moreover, to date, courts are not finding
that market-based reforms constitute intentional discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, or various state anti-discrimination laws.
For example, in Philadelphia, parents and students filed a lawsuit
against the Philadelphia School System challenging the impact of public school
closures and charter school expansion on poor, minority, and disabled students
in North Philadelphia.227 They alleged that the defendants were “closing
neighborhood traditional public schools . . . [and] forcing plaintiffs to either
[gain] admission into a local charter school or travel to another traditional
public school through high crime areas where there was gang recruitment.”228
The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated their equal protection and
substantive due process rights.229 The plaintiffs ultimately voluntarily dismissed
the case after reaching a settlement with the school district.230 Importantly,
however, the court noted that even if the plaintiffs had not dismissed the case
voluntarily, their claims were unlikely to succeed because the “issues [they]
raised [were] political question[s]”231 better suited for the legislature than the
court.
In Chicago, parents of Black students also brought a lawsuit in federal
court challenging the disparate impact that public school closings were having
on African-American students.232 In particular, they challenged the closing of
49 elementary schools in predominately Black neighborhoods and sought a
preliminary injunction to stop the closings.233 The cornerstone of the plaintiffs’
complaint was that as a result of the school closings, “African-American
students [were] suffer[ing] a disproportionate degree of academic harm . . . as
compared to their non-African-American peers.”234 In response, the school
district denied that the closings were racially discriminatory and instead cited
underutilization of schools in predominately Black neighborhoods and the need
to save money as the reason for closing the schools.235

227

See Complaint, V.L. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 2:12-cv-03182 (E.D. Pa. filed June 5,
2012), ECF No. 1.
228
Id. at 15.
229
Id.
230
See Transcript of Settlement Conference at 5, V.L. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 2:12-cv03182 (E.D. Pa. filed July 17, 2012), ECF No. 11.
231
Id. at 11–12.
232
Swan v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
233
Id. at *1.
234
Id. at *21.
235
Id. at *3.
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The plaintiffs countered by focusing specifically on the utilization
criteria used by the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”) to determine which
schools to close.236 They alleged that the utilization criteria resulted in AfricanAmerican students disproportionately bearing the brunt of school closures.237
They pointed to statistics showing that “African–American students make up
87% of the students in the closing schools, but only 40.5% of the students in
CPS as a whole.”238 They alleged such a disparity amounted to a violation of
the Illinois Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) which, amongst other things, prohibits
discriminatory administration of any state program and allows proof of
discriminatory administration to be shown through evidence of disparate
impact.239
Despite the stark racial differences between the overall racial
composition of the Chicago public schools and the schools slated for closure,
the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the closures violated the ICRA.240
The court noted that in order to prevail on their ICRA claim, the plaintiffs had
to “isolate and identify specific practices that are allegedly responsible for any
observed statistical disparities” and show that they were “subject[] to an
adverse action.”241 With respect to the policy or practice prong, the court found
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that it was the
utilization criteria used by the Chicago schools that resulted in the disparate
impact upon African-American students.242 In reaching that conclusion, the
court reasoned that additional criteria other than the utilization criteria—such as
the ability to maintain a high quality facility at a low cost—went into the
decision to close the 49 elementary schools.243 As a result, the court found that
the plaintiffs failed to present statistical evidence of a “degree and kind” that
could demonstrate that CPS violated the ICRA through its use of the utilization
criteria.244
More significantly, the court also held that the plaintiffs failed to show
that the closures resulted in any actionable harm against African-American
students.245 In so finding, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ evidence
showed that the schools the students would be transferred to as a result of the
closures were similar to but not worse than the schools they were leaving (and
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238
239
240
241
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243
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Id. at *19–20.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *12, *21.
Id. at *19–20.
Id. at *20.
Id.
Id. at *21.
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in the case of 12% of the students who would be transferred the schools would
be better).246 Notably, in reaching its conclusion the court went to great lengths
to note that the loss of a neighborhood school was not the type of harm that a
court should give much weight to in determining whether an actionable harm
was committed.247 Finally, the court also determined that the Chicago public
school system offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the school
closures, namely that the closing of so-called underutilized schools would save
money which could then be reallocated to schools throughout the district.248
Similarly, plaintiffs in Washington, D.C., challenging the exclusionary
impact of market-based reforms were also unsuccessful. In Smith v. Henderson,
advocates for poor minority children sought a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Washington, D.C. public school system from going forward
with a plan to close 15 public schools with low enrollment.249 They alleged that
the school closures, along with an expansion of charter schools in D.C., were
racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the D.C. Human Rights
Act.250 The plaintiffs presented evidence that 93% of the students displaced as a
result of the closures were Black, 6.6% Latino, while less than 0.1%—or fewer
than six students—were white.251 This contrasted with the overall
demographics of the District in which 69% of students were Black, 16%
Latino, 11% white, and 4% Asian, other, or unknown.252 The plaintiffs claimed
that this disparity demonstrated that the District was engaging in
unconstitutional racial discrimination.253
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, emphasizing that many of
plaintiffs’ “contentions are political rather than legal.”254 The court emphasized
the heavy burden that the plaintiffs bore in trying to establish the kind of
intentional discrimination needed to prevail on a Title VI or equal protection
claim.255 The court emphasized that they would need to show that the schools
were closed “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’” the impact

246
Id. at *22 (citing testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert witness stating that approximately
12.5% of students from closing schools were sent to better performing schools, where one would
expect the students to improve academically, but that 87% of students would be transferred to
schools where one would not expect improved academic performance).
247
Id. at *23–24.
248
Id.
249
54 F. Supp. 3d 58, 60–61, 69 (D.D.C. 2014).
250
Id. at 64–65.
251
Id. at 64.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id. at 67.
255
Id. at 68–69.
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on the closure’s minority students.256 Although the court conceded that
statistics cited by the plaintiffs were stark, the court determined that the district
provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the disparities through its
allegation that closing the under-enrolled schools would save resources that
could be spread throughout the district to the benefit of all students.257
Challenges to charter schools expansion in Washington, D.C., have
also met a similar unsuccessful fate. In Save Our Schools-Southeast and
Northeast v. District of Columbia Board of Education, plaintiffs alleged that
the D.C. public school system created a dual and unequal system of education
in which charter schools were given more funding and resources than
traditional public schools.258 As a result, the plaintiffs alleged students in
charter schools received better educational opportunities.259 The plaintiffs
further alleged that the dichotomy in resources given to charter schools versus
public schools was racially discriminatory because the traditional public
schools were predominately Black and poor while the charter schools were
primarily white and affluent families.260
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.261 The court
instead found that the plaintiffs failed to allege or demonstrate any
discriminatory intent underlying the different funding and resources given to
charter schools versus traditional public schools.262 The court further noted that
the plaintiffs conceded that mismanagement and incompetent leadership
explained, at least in part, some of the reasons why the predominately Black
traditional public schools offered fewer educational opportunities.263 Because
the plaintiffs conceded that reasons other than a discriminatory motive by the
school system caused the injury of which plaintiffs complained (i.e. fewer
educational opportunities), the court found that the plaintiffs failed to state an
equal protection claim.264 Courts in other jurisdictions considering race-based
challenges to charter school expansion have come to similar conclusions.265
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Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 257–58
(1979)).
257
Id. at 64.
258
See Save Our Schs.-Se. & Ne. v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 04-01500(HHK), 2006 WL
1827654, at *1 (D.D.C. July 3, 2006).
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See id.
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See id. at *11–12.
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Id. at *13.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Indeed, in the face of race-based equal protection challenges to charter school expansion
in both gentrifying and non-gentrifying areas, most courts have found that plaintiffs challenging
the expansion of charter schools cannot demonstrate racial discrimination because they fail to
show the requisite discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 485–87
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As demonstrated above, court challenges to both public school closures
and charter school expansion have been unsuccessful. This is the case primarily
because of the inability of plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent. In the public
school closure cases in particular, the only tangible evidence plaintiffs can
typically present that the facially neutral public school policies are
discriminatory is the disparate impact that the school closures would have on
poor Black and Latino communities. Yet, as other legal scholars have noted,
the discriminatory intent requirement places a nearly insurmountable obstacle
on plaintiffs.266 Government actions usually involve a multitude of motives and
an improper motive can easily be subsumed within a proper motive.267 Indeed,
the courts’ decisions in Swann and Smith focused heavily on the nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the school systems for closing the schools—
specifically the alleged underutilization of those schools and the cost savings
that would accrue by closing the schools.268
Importantly, however, in heavily deferring to the school system’s
underutilization rationale, the courts completely ignored the history of
discrimination that gave rise to the conditions which caused public schools in
predominately Black neighborhoods to be underutilized in the first place. In
particular, both the Swann and Smith decisions fail to account for or assign
responsibility to the school systems for the history of racial segregation and
inadequate funding once white flight occurred in these school systems.269 The
courts likely ignored this history because of the narrow scope of the
discriminatory intent requirement of the disparate impact analysis. In this
analysis, only the motive of the actor is considered without any historical
context.270 As a result, the plaintiffs in Swann and Smith were unable to
(10th Cir. 1996) (Latino parents challenging the closing of traditional public elementary schools
and opening of charter schools in their place as racially discriminatory in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, but the court finding that the school system did
not have discriminatory intent in closing the elementary schools and opening the charter schools),
abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
266
Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 40–41 (1977) (critiquing the discriminatory
purpose requirement imposed in disparate impact cases).
267
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) (noting that “a motive-centered doctrine
of racial discrimination places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the
wrong side of the dispute. Improper motives are easy to hide.”).
268
See, e.g., Smith v. Henderson, 54 F. Supp. 3d 58, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that the
racial disparities related to the school closings were related to the location of the schools, not
intentional discrimination), appeal dismissed, No. 14-7120 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); Swann v.
Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013 WL 4401439, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013)
(finding that the school board’s stated assertion of wanting to save money by closing
underutilized schools was a valid and non-discriminatory reason for the closures).
269
See generally sources cited supra note 268.
270
See Eisenberg, supra note 266, at 114–15.
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demonstrate that the schools were slated for closure because of, and not in spite
of, the impact closure would have on minority students. This will prove
problematic for any litigant attempting to show that public school closings and
charter school expansion are intentionally discriminatory.
B. Administrative Challenges to Market-Based Public School Reforms
Advocates attempting to stop school closures and charter school
expansion that disparately impact poor and minority students are also filing
administrative complaints with OCR.271 They are alleging that the school
closings and charter school expansion violate Title VI.272 To date, such
complaints have been filed in gentrifying urban cities such as Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Newark, New Jersey; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Chicago,
Illinois.273 Advocates are using this approach because agencies charged with
enforcing Title VI are able to rely upon regulations that state that if a program
or policy has a disparate impact on protected classes, it is a violation of Title
VI.274 The ability to use the disparate impact regulations in the context of
challenging public school closings is limited to OCR because the Supreme
Court held that the disparate impact regulations cannot be enforced through a
private right of action.275 Thus, only OCR, and not private individuals, can use
a disparate impact theory to challenge public school closings and charter school
expansion.
Given the disparate impact shown in cases such as Smith and Swann in
Washington, D.C., and Chicago respectively, filing administrative complaints
with OCR under a disparate impact theory of discrimination is the most
promising legal avenue in which to challenge public school closures and
charter school expansion. Yet, that strategy will also be challenging for at least
three reasons.
First, upon receiving a complaint, OCR first investigates the complaint
to determine whether it has any merit.276 In conducting the investigation, OCR
uses a variety of fact-finding techniques in order to determine whether the
allegations in the complaint have merit.277 A number of advocates suggest that
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See, e.g., sources cited supra note 226.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 226.
273
See Layton, supra note 168; JOURNEY FOR JUSTICE ALL., supra 203, at 1.
274
See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2015).
275
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001) (“This Court has not, however, held
that Title VI disparate-impact regulations may be enforced through a private right of action.”).
276
See Office of Civil Rights, OCR Complaint Processing Procedures, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC.
(Feb. 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaints-how.html.
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Id. (“OCR may use a variety of fact-finding techniques in its investigation of a complaint.
These techniques may include reviewing documentary evidence submitted by both parties,
272
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OCR during the fact-finding investigative stage “does not appear to regularly
apply the adverse impact doctrine in complaint investigations and
determinations,” but instead applies the more stringent intentional
discrimination standard.278 In the context of school closures and charter school
expansions, the use of disparate impact analysis is likely critical to finding a
violation of Title VI. As demonstrated in the Swann and Smith cases, under a
strict intentional discrimination theory, it is unlikely that the school closings
and charter school expansions will be deemed discriminatory.279 If the
intentional discrimination theory is indeed used when investigating the school
closures and charter school expansions, it is highly unlikely that OCR will find
a violation of Title VI.
Second, as other scholars have also noted, the vigor of any OCR
investigation is very much dependent upon a number of factors including
political priorities.280 As discussed in Part II.B, the executive branch’s embrace
of charter school expansion, at a minimum, calls into question the likelihood of
OCR finding that the school closings and charter school expansions are
discriminatory.
Third, even if OCR were to find a violation and find it necessary to sue
in federal court in order to ensure compliance, despite the existence of the
disparate impact regulations, OCR would still have a difficult time meeting its
legal burden of showing that the school closings and charter school expansions
violate Title VI. In assessing whether a policy or practice violates Title VI
under a disparate impact theory, courts follow the same burden-shifting
framework used in Title VII disparate impact cases.281 Thus, a plaintiff must
first make a prima facie showing of discrimination. He or she must demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that a recipient of federal funds adopted a

conducting interviews with the complainant, recipient’s personnel, and other witnesses, and/or
site visits.”).
278
David Simson, Exclusion, Punishment, Racism and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory
Perspective on School Discipline, 61 UCLA L. REV. 506, 513 (2014); see also Adira Siman,
Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State Legal Remedies for Students of Color, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 438 (2005).
279
See generally Smith v. Henderson, 54 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2014), appeal dismissed,
No. 14-7120 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015); Swann v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623, 13 C 3624, 2013
WL 44014395 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
280
See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering That Has No Name: Title VI and the
Meaning of Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1311–12, 1328 (2014) (“The
disadvantages of the administrative process are well understood, including potential problems of
bureaucratic torpor, politics, and even capture.”).
281
See Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir.
1985) (noting that “[t]he elements of a disparate impact claim may be gleaned by reference to
cases decided under Title VII”), abrogated by Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989);
see also N.Y. Urb. League v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Courts considering
claims under analogous Title VI regulations have looked to Title VII disparate impact cases for
guidance.”).
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facially race neutral policy that has a disproportionate impact on a protected
category of individuals.282 Importantly, a finding that the disparate impact
would have existed in the absence of the policy or action taken by a federal
fund recipient will impede a plaintiff’s ability to meet this showing.283 For
example, if a defendant school system were able to show that the schools would
have been closed because all neighborhood children chose to go elsewhere,
OCR would likely be unable to make its prima facie case.
Assuming OCR is able to make a prima facie case, the burden would
then shift to the defendant school systems to show that they have a “substantial
and legitimate justification” for closings schools and expanding charter
schools.284 In the context of education cases, courts interpret this to mean that
the defendant school system must show that “their challenged practices ‘bear a
manifest demonstrable relationship to classroom education.’”285 Courts set a
low bar for what this means in practical terms. Courts have found that the
defendant school system only needs to show that the challenged practice is
necessary to meet an important educational goal.286 In the Swann and Smith
cases, the plaintiffs argued that the school closures met the important goal of
saving money that could be better used to help students district wide by
eliminating underutilized schools.287 Such a justification is likely to be used by
other school systems. Given the low bar set by courts, this would in all
likelihood be considered a substantial and legitimate justification.288
Lastly, if a school system did indeed show a substantial and legitimate
justification for closing schools, OCR could then only prevail by showing that
there are effective alternative practices that would have less of a racially
disparate impact or that the school closings were a pretext for discrimination.289
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See Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417.
Elston v. Talledega Cty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[P]laintiff
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284
See Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417–18.
285
Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412 (quoting Ga. St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1418).
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under public schools and expanding charter schools).
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It would likely be difficult for OCR to convince a court that there are effective
alternative practices, as courts often loathe to wade into what they consider
questions of appropriate education policy.290 Similarly, showing that the
closings were a pretext for discrimination would also be difficult as it would
require OCR to prove subjective intent on the part of the school system, which
as other scholars have noted, is extremely difficult.291 For these reasons,
administrative challenges through OCR are unlikely to halt the public school
closings and charter school expansion.
In sum, challenges to market-based reforms through the courts and
OCR have not proved successful. Poor and minority students continue to be
harmed by market-based reforms but are left without a viable remedy due to the
ineffectiveness of the litigation-based challenges. As discussed in the following
Part, enacting state legislation that seeks to capitalize on the shared interests of
gentrifiers and poor and minority students is one potential solution that may
prove effective.
V. GENTRIFICATION, URBAN PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORMS, AND THE
POSSIBILITIES FOR INTEREST CONVERGENCE
The renewed interest of white middle class gentrifiers in urban public
schools presents a rare situation in which the interests of gentrifiers and poor
minority families actually coincide. Yet local officials are creating an
unnecessary and harmful interest divergence between gentrifiers and poor and
minority families in an attempt to cater to the interest of gentrifiers. Further, to
date, the only recourse that advocates have utilized to remedy the problem
(unsuccessfully) are legal claims with the courts and OCR. This Part situates
the shared interests of poor minority families and gentrifiers in improving
urban public schools within the context of Derek Bell’s Interest Convergence
Theory. It concludes by offering suggestions on how to use the Interest
Convergence Theory to formulate effective legislative-based urban school
reforms that benefit all children in urban schools.

290
See, e.g., Smith, 54 F. Supp. at 7 (“For any policymaker, whether to embrace these
[school] reforms is a difficult question that requires expert judgment. For courts, it is simply an
impossible—indeed, an impermissible—question to answer.”).
291
See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination By Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731
(2011) (noting the challenges in proving discriminatory intent).

726

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

A. The Interest Convergence Theory
The Interest Convergence Theory was created by Professor Derek Bell
in order to explain the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.292 The theory posits that
the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites. The fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not
authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality
for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior
societal status of middle and upper class whites.293
The theory further suggests that protection of minorities in racial cases
“may not actually be determined by the character of the harm suffered by
blacks or quantum of liability against whites . . . instead [it will be determined
by] the subconscious judicial conclusion that the remedies, if granted, will . . .
advance or at least not harm societal interest deemed important . . . [to]
whites.”294 Professor Bell used this theory to explain how the Supreme Court’s
decision to end racial segregation in schools coincided with elite whites’
interests in winning the Cold War.295 More specifically, he suggested that elite
whites had an interest in ending racial segregation in public schools to assure
Black Americans that they were a welcome part of the American democracy
and to lend credibility to America’s fight against Communism.296
The Interest Convergence Theory examines the progress that Blacks
(and other minorities) have made in America from a historical perspective,
looking not at “what will be” but “what has been.”297 It describes societal or
macro changes—it does not describe the subjective motivations or
psychological attitudes of all individuals.298 Thus, the Interest Convergence
Theory suggests that historically racial progress tends to occur when there is a
convergence between minority and white interests, regardless of the
psychological motivations of individuals.299 Significantly, the Interest
Convergence Theory does not suggest that the aggregate of minority interests
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See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
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See Stephan F. Feldman, Do the Right Thing: Understanding the Interest Convergence
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and white interests always coincide.300 It does suggest, however, that on a
macro level, in some instances some minorities and some whites will have
shared interests and that when those shared interests coincide, racial progress
will occur.
The Interest Convergence Theory, while initially dismissed as
substantially inaccurate, has come to gain acceptance amongst a broad swath of
advocates and scholars.301 The theory is often utilized to explain court cases
and trends.302 It is also used as an affirmative tool or strategy to get legislative
reform enacted.303 The section that follows examines how the Interest
Convergence Theory might be used to enact legislation that satisfies the
interests of both poor and minority families and gentrifiers.
B. Creating Interest Convergence Between Poor and Minority Families
and Gentrifiers
Using the Interest Convergence Theory as a guide, if the ultimate goal
for local governments is to better urban public schools through gentrification
without disproportionately affecting poor minority students, progress will occur
if we cause the interests of the poor minority students and gentrifying students
to converge. Poor and minority parents and students have long had an interest
in improving urban public schools, particularly after years of decline and decay
brought on by middle-class white flight. As a result of the resurgence of urban
gentrification and an influx of middle- and upper-middle class white
professionals, white middle- and upper-middle class residents also, at least in
the abstract, share an interest in improving urban public schools with poor and
minority families.
In reality, however, this shared interest is complicated by the nuances
of race and class. While middle-class white gentrifiers are interested in seeing
improvements to urban school systems, their interest is understandably limited
to reforms that positively impact the options available to them, rather than the
system as a whole. Paradoxically, even though many gentrifiers express a
desire for schools with racial diversity, when choosing schools they also tend to
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Id.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes—
Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 369, 373 (2002)
(“[Professor Bell’s] hypothesis was greeted with cries of outrage. Deemed a cynical explanation
of whites’ benevolent conduct, it was dismissed as the jaded speculation of a civil rights warrior
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prefer schools with a smaller minority student population because of the
negative perceptions attached to schools with high concentrations of minority
students.304 As a result, gentrifiers often do not object to, but instead demand,
market-based reforms that increase the urban public school options available to
them while simultaneously increasing race and class segregation in urban
schools.305 Thus, an interest displacement rather than an interest convergence is
created between gentrifier families and poor and minority families.
The challenge therefore is to understand the ways in which interest
convergence rather than interest displacement can be created between poor and
minority families and middle-class gentrifier families. The key question in this
analysis involves finding ways to get white gentrifiers to care about and
become invested in the schooling options available to poor minority families. In
other words, one must expand the abstract interest (that poor minority families
and gentrifiers share in improving urban school systems) to a more concrete
one that allows gentrifiers to disfavor school reform methods that improve only
a subset of the urban public school system in ways that only benefit them.
One way to create interest convergence is to expand white gentrifiers’
understanding of what is in both their short-term and long-term self-interest. To
be sure, self-interest is a key component in creating interest convergence.306
The Interest Convergence Theory suggests that it is only when the self-interest
of elite whites is in line with racial justice for minorities will such justice
actually occur.307 In the case of urban public school reforms, important selfinterests that gentrifiers hold are being obfuscated by the marginal increase in
the urban public school choices made available to them by market-based
reforms. In particular, the number of quality charter schools or traditional
public schools in many urban school systems is in short-supply. At some point,
as gentrification expands, there will no longer be enough seats in the best
charter schools or best traditional public schools for all gentrifier children.
Indeed, this is already the case in cities like Philadelphia and Washington,
D.C., where the demand for quality public schools by gentrifiers is greatly
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See Posey, supra note 5, at 17–18 (noting that for gentrifier parents, “race, class, and
school quality [are] conflated in [their] minds” and finding that gentrifier parents were reluctant
to send their children to a school with a high concentration of African-American students because
such a school is associated with poverty and less rigorous academic programs).
305
See, e.g., STILLMAN, supra note 9, at 100–01.
306
See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology
Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 288 (2005) (suggesting that “a more
enlightened understanding of self-interest can form the basis for political coalitions that [are able
to] transcend race, class, and ideology”).
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outstripping the supply.308 For that reason, it is in the long-term best interest of
gentrifiers to become invested in reforms that improve the entire urban public
school system rather than a small cross-section of the system.
Further, as previously noted, gentrifiers expect the amenities in urban
cities to match their higher class status.309 Research suggests that for the
gentrifier demographic, white middle- and upper-class residents, construction
of what constitutes a quality public school is heavily depended upon the overall
perception of the school system in which the individual school is situated. 310 A
school is more likely to be perceived as a high quality school by white middleand upper-class residents if it is part of a school system that has strong
reputation.311 To the extent that gentrifiers do indeed want the schools that they
select for their children to be perceived as high quality, enacting reforms that
improve urban public systems from top to bottom rather than a few choice
schools would go a long way towards that interest.
Finally, gentrifiers have a long-term specific economic self-interest in
ensuring that urban school reforms increase educational opportunities for all
students, not just their own. An educated workforce is a necessary pre-requisite
for economic growth, particularly in the new knowledge-based economy.312
Continued growth of urban areas is predicated upon having a well-educated
urban populace. Yet scholars have noted that because “of the growing number
of minority students in public schools, if existing educational trends continue,
the nation risks something it has never before seen: an intergenerational decline
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(June
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https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/fullreport.pdf
(documenting the ways in which higher levels of education will shape the job opportunities
available to workers).

730

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

in its educational level, a threatening outcome in a knowledge-based, global
economy.”313 To the extent that gentrifiers are part of the knowledge-based
group of workers that benefit from a revitalized and economically strong urban
core, they should support urban school reforms that benefit and provide more
opportunity for a larger cross-section of the urban city.
C. Using Legislative Solutions to Capitalize on Interest Convergence
Focusing on the aforementioned ways in which the self-interest of
gentrifiers can be used to create true interest convergence with poor and
minority families offers a rare opportunity to improve urban public schools:
improvements that will actually have substantive benefits for poor and minority
students. The following is a non-exhaustive list of potential legislative solutions
that, if implemented, could meet the interests of both poor and minority
families and gentrifier families.
First, as other scholars have noted, most low-performing schools in
urban areas are low-performing because, among other things, students and their
families are dealing with a plethora of non-school issues that make learning
difficult.314 Instead of closing low-performing schools and replacing them with
charter schools, a better alternative might be to replace low-performing schools
with Community Based Schools (“CBS”). CBSs are schools that partner with
other public service providers to provide not just educational services, but also
much needed support to distressed communities in areas such as health care,
counseling, adult education, and cultural events.315
For example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, the Cincinnati School District
revamped its failing schools with CBSs called community learning centers.316
The community learning centers in Cincinnati have shown modest but
important progress. Improved graduation rates, test scores, attendance, and
community revitalization have been a hallmark of the community learning
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center expansion in Cincinnati.317 Some form of CBSs have been successfully
implemented in other high poverty urban school systems and achieved similar
successes.318
Given the self-interest that gentrifiers should have in improving all
aspects of urban school systems, enacting CBSs could achieve that goal while
simultaneously providing meaningful learning opportunities for poor minority
children and revitalizing predominately poor and minority communities. In
order to ensure their substantive quality, CBSs could be subject to monitoring
requirements similar to the monitoring requirements in the school
desegregation context in the South. In those southern school districts, prior to
achieving unitary status, each district had to file reports documenting the
quality of the curricular offerings to Black students, discipline measures, access
to extracurricular activities, the quality of the teaching staff, etc.319
One obvious question with respect to CBSs is the question of scale. In
particular, whether a system of CBSs could be implemented on a district-wide
basis given the high number of failing schools in many urban districts and the
intensive financial and manpower cost associated with putting CBSs in place.320
One answer to this dilemma might be to implement CBS on an individual
school-wide basis rather than systematically in areas with no or limited public
schools available.321 Such an approach, though not ideal, would at least be a
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start to creating more educational opportunities for poor minority students
while at the same time improving the overall quality of the school system.
Second, in the event that a school closure is indeed necessary as a
result of low-enrollment or underutilization, state legislation should be enacted
to ensure that the closing of a public school does not destabilize a
neighborhood. Such legislation could include a rule regarding replacement of
closed public schools that is similar to the one-for-one replacement rule used to
ensure that affordable housing remains when public housing units are
demolished.322 While the one-for-one replacement rule was eventually repealed
by Congress (and arguably contributed to the displacement of poor and
minorities from gentrifying areas), the new Choice Neighborhoods Initiative
has a replacement rule worth modeling.323 The new Choice Neighborhoods
Initiative Rule requires that “grantees build at least one subsidized replacement
housing unit for every unit demolished in the target development, except when
objective measures indicate that the local housing market is too weak to
warrant full replacement.”324
Similarly, state legislation targeting school closures could require that
every neighborhood have at least one public school within a specific proximity
(for example, two miles), except when objective measures indicate that there
would be issues obtaining adequate enrollment in a replacement school. Having
neighborhood schools in predominantly Black and Latino neighborhoods
benefits cities as a whole to the extent that schools serve a stabilizing function
in neighborhoods.325 Requiring that schools be replaced where feasible is a
better solution than the market-based reforms because such measures aim to
ensure that there are neighborhood schools in Black and Latino neighborhoods.
Third, and finally, while the proliferation of charter schools is often
viewed as a positive in terms of providing parents with more choices, the
reality is often that very few charter schools provide high quality education.326
Both poor and minority families and more affluent gentrifier families are left
fighting for the limited number of slots in the better charter schools. 327 Thus,
both groups should have a similar interest in lobbying for legislation that limits
incentives for further expansion of charter schools and instead calls for
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increased investment in public schools. For example, some advocates suggest
applying pressure at the federal level to exclude charter schools from receiving
the New Market Tax Credit,328 a credit often given to charter schools located in
urban areas as part of a broader scheme to spur investment in low-income
communities.329 This is one solution worth pursuing along with a simultaneous
push for added incentives through Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act330 (“ESEA”) for urban school systems that maintain a balance of
having at least 70% traditional public schools versus no more than 30% charter
schools. The push should be for amendments to the ESEA that provide
additional funding for school districts in which at least 70% of the schools
within the system are traditional public schools.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examines the implications of gentrification on urban
public schools. In particular, it argues that certain market-based reforms are
being implemented en masse, at least in part, in order to make urban public
schools more attractive options for gentrifiers. However, the current reliance
upon market-based reforms to improve urban school systems creates an
unnecessary rift between the interests of gentrifiers and the interests of poor
and minority students. These market-based reforms are ultimately harming the
poor, minority students in urban cities by creating school deserts and charter
schools that favor the interests of gentrifiers. Both gentrifiers and poor and
minority students have an interest in improving urban public schools. As a
result, a unique opportunity exists to reform urban public school systems in
ways that benefit all students. Legislative reform, rather than solely marketbased reform and reactionary litigation, should be used to reform urban schools
in ways that benefit both poor and minority students and gentrifiers alike.
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